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ABSTRACT
Accounts of privacy law have focused on legislation, federal agencies, and the self-regula-
tion of privacy professionals.  Crucial agents of regulatory change, however, have been over-
looked: the state attorneys general (AGs).  This Article is the first in-depth study of the privacy
norm entrepreneurship of state attorneys general.  Because so little has been written about this
phenomenon, I engaged with primary sources by examining documentary evidence received
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to attorney general offices around
the country and interviewing state attorneys general and current and former career staff.
Much as Justice Louis Brandeis imagined states as laboratories of the law, offices of state
attorneys general have been laboratories of privacy enforcement.  State attorneys general have been
nimble privacy enforcers whereas federal agencies have been more constrained by politics.  Local
knowledge, specialization, multistate coordination, and broad legal authority have allowed AG
offices to fill in gaps in the law.  State attorneys general have established baseline fair-informa-
tion protections and expanded the frontiers of privacy law to cover sexual intimacy and youth.
Their efforts have reinforced and strengthened federal norms, further harmonizing certain aspects
of privacy and data security policy.
Although certain systemic practices enhance AG privacy policymaking, others blunt its
impact, including an overreliance on weak informal agreements and a reluctance to issue closing
letters identifying data practices that comply with the law.  This Article offers ways state attorneys
general can function more effectively through informal and formal proceedings.  It addresses
concerns about the potential pile-up of enforcement activity, federal preemption, capture, and the
dormant Commerce Clause.  It urges state enforcers to act more boldly in the face of certain
shadowy data practices.
INTRODUCTION
Accounts of privacy law have focused on legislation,1 federal agencies,2
and the self-regulation of privacy professionals.3  Crucial agents of regulatory
change, however, have been neglected: the state attorneys general.  This Arti-
cle fills that void with the first in-depth study of the privacy policymaking of
state attorneys general.
The privacy norm entrepreneurship of state attorneys general is ripe for
assessment.  In the past fifteen years, attorneys general have devoted signifi-
cant time and energy to privacy and data security enforcement.  State attor-
neys general have worked on privacy and data security issues individually,
1 See, e.g., Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 595 (2016); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009) [here-
inafter Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy]; Paul M. Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism,
in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 324 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism].
2 See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
(2016); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015) [hereinafter Hartzog & Solove, Scope and Potential];
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) [hereinafter Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy].
3 See, e.g., KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND:
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 21 (2015); Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV.
247, 249–50 (2011).
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collectively, and through the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG).4  The Privacy Working Group, coordinated by NAAG, has enabled
offices to share expertise and resources.5  Some offices have led the charge;6
others have played a supporting role by joining multistate efforts.7
State attorneys general have been on the front lines of privacy enforce-
ment since before the intervention of federal agencies.8  In the 1990s, while
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was emphasizing self-regulation, state
attorneys general were arguing that consumer protection laws required the
adoption of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).9  Then, as now,
4 NAAG, a professional membership organization, helps organize multistate litiga-
tion, develop model statutes and best practices, and write reports articulating a common
approach amongst the states. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
246 (Emily Myers & Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. eds., 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter STATE ATTOR-
NEYS GENERAL].
5 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Matthew Fitzsimmons, Head of Privacy and Data
Sec. Div., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn. (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter Fitzsimmons Inter-
view]; Telephone Interview with Deborah Hagan, Bureau Chief of Consumer Prot. Div.,
Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ill., and Matthew Van Hise, Assistant Att’y Gen. and Head of
Privacy and Identity Theft Group, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ill. (July 30, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter Hagan & Van Hise Interview].  Connecticut Assistant AG Matthew Fitzsimmons and
Illinois Assistant AG Matthew Van Hise co-lead the NAAG Privacy Working Group. See
Fitzsimmons Interview, supra; Hagan & Van Hise Interview, supra.
6 Offices taking the lead on privacy and data security enforcement include California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. See, e.g., Divonne Smoyer et
al., Beware the Growth of State AG Enforcement Efforts, CORP. COUNS. (May 22, 2015), http://
www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202727264255/Beware-the-Growth-of-State-AG-Enforcement-
Efforts.
7 See infra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that twenty-seven states have
participated in one or more multistate investigations in the past five years).
8 Denise Gellene, Chalk One up for Privacy: American Express Will Inform Cardholders That
It Sorts Them for Sales Pitches, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-
05-14/business/fi-3033_1_american-express (noting that New York AG Robert Abrams
investigated credit card companies for failing to inform consumers that their shopping
patterns were being used to categorize them for advertising campaigns in violation of state
consumer protection law); Chris Woodyard, Lungren Joins Suit Accusing TRW of ‘Illegal Prac-
tices’, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-09/business/fi-2151_1
_trw-s-credit (explaining that attorneys general sued a major credit-reporting agency for
failing to prevent errors in credit reports and selling consumers’ data to marketers); Tele-
phone Interview with Susan Henrichsen, Cal. Assistant Att’y Gen. 1990–2005 (July 14,
2015) [hereinafter Henrichsen Interview] (explaining that the privacy enforcement
actions in the 1990s involved credit-reporting agencies, telemarketing, spam, browser cook-
ies, and spyware).
9 See, e.g., Chris Oakes, Michigan Warns Sites on Privacy, WIRED (June 14, 2000), http://
archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/06/36967?currentPage=all (describing law-
suits brought by the Michigan Attorney General’s Office against four websites, including a
medical site, a financial site, a children’s site, and an adult site, alleging that collection of
personal data without notice violated state consumer protection law); see also Dee-Ann
Durbin, Privacy Rights on Web Sought: State Attorneys General Take Lead on Privacy, LEDGER
(Feb. 10, 2001), https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1346&dat=20010210&id=uC
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state unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws (known as “UDAP
laws”) were central to privacy-related enforcement activity.
In certain areas, the proactivity of state attorneys general has preceded
that of their federal regulatory counterparts.  Their offices established base-
line protections for privacy policies, data-breach notification, do-not-track
browser settings, and certain uses of bank-history databases.10  Even as attor-
neys general shaped conceptions of what privacy enforcement should
achieve, they extended privacy enforcement to new frontiers, including sex-
ual intimacy and youth.11
State attorneys general have been nimble privacy enforcement pioneers,
a role that for practical and political reasons would be difficult for federal
agencies to replicate.  Because attorneys general do not have to wrestle with
the politics of agency commissioners or deal with layers of bureaucracy, they
can move quickly on privacy and data security initiatives.  Career staff have
developed specialties and expertise growing out of a familiarity with local
conditions and constituent concerns.  Because attorneys general are on the
front lines, they are often the first to learn about and respond to privacy and
security violations.  Because constituents express concern about privacy and
data security, so in turn do state attorneys general who tend to harbor ambi-
tions for higher office.
This is an auspicious time to study the contributions of state privacy
enforcers.  Even as Congress has been mired in gridlock, attorneys general
have helped fill gaps in privacy law through legislation, education, and
enforcement.  They have worked with state lawmakers on consumer privacy
issues.  AG offices have set privacy and security norms in the absence of fed-
eral leadership, a trend that may escalate in the coming years.12  They have
JOAAAAIBAJ&sjid=eP0DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6251,6993124&hl=en (reporting that a multistate
group sued banks for selling customers’ confidential information without express permis-
sion in violation of state unfair and deceptive practice laws, and that browser providers
were investigated for failing to give consumers notice and the chance to opt out of the
tracking of their online activities).
10 FIPPs’ protections enhance individuals’ ability to control the extent to which their
personal data is collected, used, and shared. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 3, at
21.  FIPPs include providing notice to data subjects, securing consent for data practices,
ensuring data security, and securing opportunities for people to check the accuracy of data
held about them. Id. at 22.
11 See infra subsections II.B.5–6.
12 Given the impending presidential administration of Donald Trump and the Repub-
lican Party’s control of both Houses of Congress, federal agencies like the FTC and FCC
will likely slow down their consumer privacy enforcement efforts. See Jedidiah Bracy, What
Will a Trump Administration Mean for Privacy, IAPP (Nov. 10, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/
a/what-will-a-trump-administration-mean-for-privacy/.  There are three open commis-
sioner seats (of five) at the FCC and two open seats (of five) at the FTC, as well as the seat
of outgoing Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, which will be filled by President-elect Trump. Id.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency created by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act, could be dramatically reshaped, as promised by Republican
lawmakers, as might its role in enforcing the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the first federal
privacy law passed in 1970. See James Rufus Koren, Trump Administration Could Upend Post-
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reinforced and strengthened federal norms on data security among other
issues.  As California’s Attorney General Kamala Harris aptly put it, “We are
at an important inflection point, a convergence of AG interest in consumer
protection, emerging technologies, and data privacy.”13  The result is the
emergence of stronger privacy and data security protections.
This Article has three Parts.  Part I provides an overview of the state
attorney general’s consumer-privacy mission.  It identifies AG offices leading
consumer privacy efforts and offices supporting their work.  Part II describes
the regulatory tools available to states to shape privacy practices.  Then, it
documents key areas where offices of attorneys general have set, shaped, and
entrenched privacy and data security norms.  Part III evaluates the strengths
and weaknesses of AG privacy policymaking and offers suggestions for
improvement.  It addresses concerns about the potential pile-up of enforce-
ment activity and interest group capture.  It explores limits imposed by fed-
eral preemption and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  Part III ends with
suggestions about potential new directions for privacy enforcement.
Before turning to my analysis, let me explain my methodology.  Because
so little had been written about the privacy enforcement of state attorneys
general, my research focused on primary sources.  I filed open sunshine
requests with AG offices around the country.  FOIA requests sought materials
related to AG offices’ education campaigns, legislative efforts, and enforce-
ment activity related to consumer privacy and data security.14  An overwhelm-
ing majority of states responded, providing crucial evidence of AG privacy
policymaking.15
To put into context the material obtained through FOIA requests, I con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with state attorneys general from four
states and former and current career staff from thirteen states.16  Interviews
Crisis Finanical Reforms, Weaken CFPB, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-trump-dodd-frank-20161109-story.html.
13 Interview with Kamala Harris, Attorney Gen., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., in
L.A., Cal. (Oct. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Harris Interview]; see also Paul Pittman, State Attor-
neys General Emerge as Enforcers for Consumer Data Privacy, CYBERSECURITY TODAY (Feb. 7,
2014), http://www.cybersecuritytodayblog.com/2014/02/07/state-attorneys-general-
emerge-as-enforcers-for-consumer-data-privacy/.
14 A sample FOIA request letter is included in Appendix I.
15 Appendix II lists the responses to my FOIA requests.  Forty-two states and one terri-
tory provided responsive materials. See Appendix II.  In accord with their open sunshine
laws, four states—Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia—denied my request
because I am not a state citizen. Id.  Two states—New Jersey and South Dakota—and five
of the six territories never responded to my request. Id.  Two states conditioned a
response on my payment of significant fees ($263.79 for Montana, and $4255.76 for
Nebraska) despite my request as an academic for a waiver of the fee. Id. It is easy to
understand states that denied my request on the basis of state citizenship; those states owe
no obligation of transparency to noncitizens.  The fees asserted by Montana and Nebraska,
however, seemed exorbitant because independent research suggested that neither state
had considerable material to disclose.
16 I conducted in-person interviews with California AG Kamala Harris and Connecticut
AG George Jepsen and telephone interviews with Indiana AG Greg Zoeller and former
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focused on the following questions: In what respect has the AG’s office
worked on consumer privacy and data security concerns?  How do privacy
and data security issues come to your office’s attention?  Has the office
worked on proposed state or federal privacy and data security legislation?
Does the office devote resources to educating consumers and companies
about best practices?  Does the office meet with companies to discuss privacy
and data security?  Are particular investigative techniques and litigation strat-
egies more effective than others?  What legal authority does the office rely on
when pursuing privacy and data security investigations?  Are current laws,
notably UDAP laws, sufficient to the task?  What has been the office’s role in
multistate investigations concerning consumer privacy and data security?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of informal agreements versus litiga-
tion?  To what extent has the office worked with federal agencies on privacy
and data security issues?  Do staff have privacy training or expertise?  Does
the office have technical experts in house or on retainer?  How have the
FTC’s guidance and white papers influenced enforcement activity?  In what
areas does the office look to the FTC or other federal agencies for guidance
and leadership?
Interviews with career staff varied from interviews with state attorneys
general.  Discussions with staff tended to focus on the day-to-day experience
of working on privacy and data security issues.  Staff discussed the enforce-
ment process, including the ins and outs of investigations, pros and cons of
enforcement strategies, and practical challenges.  They talked about their
offices’ legislative work and education efforts.  Interviews with attorneys gen-
eral focused on the bigger picture—the office’s goals and priorities for pri-
vacy enforcement, the practical limits of their work, and the substantive areas
in which their activity has had the biggest impact.  Public comments of attor-
neys general and staff, views of privacy professionals, media coverage of AG
enforcement, and scholarly perspectives on the work of attorneys general
also informed my analysis.
I. THE PEOPLE’S PRIVACY LAWYERS
The office of the state attorney general has deep roots in American his-
tory.  All thirteen colonies had offices of attorneys general whose role was to
represent the sovereign in England.17  After the Revolution, these offices
were reestablished as state attorneys general under state constitutions or state
Maryland AG Douglas Gansler. See Appendix II.  I conducted in-person and telephone
interviews with former and current AG staff from Arizona, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and Wash-
ington. Id.  As former FTC Commissioner Julie Brill wisely noted while moderating a
discussion of this Article at the 2016 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, there are natural
limits to any effort to interview attorneys general and staff.  As she said well, one can only
get the access that one can get.  Comment of Julie Brill, Privacy Law Scholars Conference,
Wash., D.C. (June 2, 2016).
17 See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 165 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Ky. Ct. App.
1942).
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statutes.18  Today, all fifty states and six territories have an office of attorney
general or its functional equivalent.19
The vast majority of attorneys general are publicly elected.20  In design-
ing a popularly elected AG’s office, states aimed to “weaken the power of a
central chief executive and further an intrabranch system of checks and bal-
ances.”21  The popular election of attorneys general helped reinforce federal-
ism’s commitment to enhance governmental responsiveness to local
priorities.22
A crucial part of an attorney general’s work as the state’s chief law
enforcer involves protecting the public interest.23  As this Part explores, in
the mid- to late-twentieth century, AG offices took up the mantle of con-
sumer protection, which grew to include privacy and data security concerns.
This Part identifies the core group of offices that have taken the lead on
privacy enforcement and the significant number of offices that have sup-
ported those efforts.
A. Consumer Protection Mission
In the late 1960s and 1970s, state attorneys general embraced their role
as consumer watchdog.  An important first step was the establishment of con-
sumer protection divisions.24  Frank Kelley, who served as Michigan Attorney
18 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at 33–37.
19 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as
National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 527 (1994).
20 See Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-
State Litigation, 10 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 1, 2–3 (2010).  Attorneys general are popularly
elected in forty-three states, Guam, and the District of Columbia; they are appointed by
governors in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wyoming, American Samoa,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See STATE ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, supra note 4, at 12 n.2.  The attorney general of Maine is selected by a secret ballot of
the legislature. Id. at 12.
21 William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2451 (2006).  Most attorneys general
are independent of the governor’s office. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100,
2124 (2015).  In six states, attorneys general are members of the governor’s cabinet:
Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, and New Jersey. Clayton, supra note 19, at 529.
The AG’s Office of the District of Columbia became an independent agency in 2015 after
previously being subordinate to the District’s executive branch. See Divonne Smoyer &
Kimberly Chow, Q&A: DC Attorney General Karl Racine Talks Consumer Privacy, IAPP (Apr.
26, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/qa-dc-attorney-general-karl-racine-talks-consumer-pri-
vacy/.
22 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 2125 n.78.
23 See, e.g., State v. Culp, 823 So. 2d 510, 514 (Miss. 2002). See generally Trevor W.
Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY,
LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 81, 85 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009)
[hereinafter PREEMPTION CHOICE].
24 FRANK J. KELLEY & JACK LESSENBERRY, THE PEOPLE’S LAWYER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
FRANK J. KELLEY, THE NATION’S LONGEST-SERVING ATTORNEY GENERAL 84 (2015).
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General from 1961 to 1999, explained that one of his first acts in office was
starting a consumer protection division.25
Passing supportive legislation was the next step.  With the encourage-
ment of the FTC and attorneys general, states adopted UDAP laws.26  Much
like section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,27 the typical UDAP law
bans deceptive commercial acts and practices and unfair trade acts and prac-
tices whose costs exceed their benefits.28  UDAP laws empower attorneys gen-
eral to seek civil penalties, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.29
AG offices started focusing on privacy issues in the 1990s.  Early enforce-
ment actions targeted intrusive telemarketing, spam, spyware, and the
absence of privacy policies.30  Attorneys general relied on UDAP laws and
their common law authority to protect consumers from privacy-invasive busi-
ness practices.31  Over the years, AG enforcement power has expanded with
the passage of specific privacy and data security laws, many of which were
proposed or endorsed by state attorneys general.32  Although those laws have
been helpful, UDAP laws remain crucial to AG privacy enforcement.33
25 See id.; see also Dale A. Reinholtsen, The Role of California’s Attorney General and District
Attorneys in Protecting the Consumer, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 35, 43 (1971) (discussing how the
California Consumer Fraud Unit was established in 1959 to protect consumers from unfair,
fraudulent, or deceptive business practices).
26 KELLEY & LESSENBERRY, supra note 24, at 101–02 (explaining that Frank Kelley
helped convince Michigan lawmakers to pass his state’s consumer protection act in 1976).
Texas AG John Hill’s office helped draft the state Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which
passed in 1973. See JOHN HILL, JR. & ERNIE STROMBERGER, JOHN HILL FOR THE STATE OF
TEXAS: MY YEARS AS ATTORNEY GENERAL 17–33 (2008); see also Robert Morgan, The People’s
Advocate in the Marketplace—The Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Con-
sumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 1, 4 (1969) (discussing his role, as the
AG of North Carolina, in lobbying the state legislature to adopt a broad UDAP law so his
office could serve as the “consumers’ advocate”).
27 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
28 However, some UDAP laws diverge from the wording of section 5, with some states
banning unfair trade practices without requiring proof of consumer harm. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110m (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 4 (West 2016).
Others only ban deceptive trade practices. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at
232.
29 See, e.g., California Unfair Business Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West
2016) (imposing $2500 per violation); Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 505/7 (West 2016) (allowing civil penalty of $50,000 per unlawful act); see also Steven
J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J.
125, 128 (1987) (explaining that in states like Maryland the “consumer protection author-
ity resides wholly within the Attorney General’s Office”).
30 Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8.
31 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, 201 P.3d 472, 479 (Cal. 2009)
(holding the right to privacy applies to state actors and private parties).
33 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Nathan Black, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of the
Att’y Gen. of Iowa (June 21, 2016).
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B. The Privacy Enforcers
In the past fifteen years, a core group of states have taken the lead on
privacy enforcement: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington.34  Their offices have spearheaded multis-
tate investigations on privacy and data security matters.35  They have active
individual enforcement dockets.  Their offices have worked on privacy and
data security legislation; they have educated consumers and businesses about
best practices.36
Because privacy and data security investigations often involve compli-
cated technical questions, privacy leaders have “brought expertise in-
house.”37  Some have hired technologists and have computer labs onsite;
others have partnered with computer science departments at local universi-
ties.38  Thanks to funding secured through multistate agreements, AG staff
have undergone training with the International Association of Privacy Profes-
sionals; many have been certified as privacy professionals.39
The FTC—with its extensive technical and policy expertise—has been a
crucial source of inspiration for state attorneys general.  The FTC’s policy
reports and research have inspired states to devote resources to investigating
certain data practices.40  FTC policy has been particularly influential in
34 See infra notes 43–50, 134, 156, 219, 227, 264–65, 268–70 and accompanying text
(discussing the work and activism of state attorneys general).
35 For some privacy leaders, the bulk of enforcement activity related to privacy is spent
on multistate investigations.  Ohio, for instance, recently led a multistate investigation into
the systematic failure of credit-reporting agencies to correct inaccurate credit reports. See
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ohio, Attorney General DeWine Announces
Major National Settlement with Credit Reporting Agencies (May 20, 2015), http://www
.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/May-2015/Attorney-General-DeWine-
Announces-Major-National-S; FOIA Response Letter from Erin Leahy (June 24, 2016)
(Ohio) (on file with author).  Pennsylvania has served on the executive committee of sev-
eral multistate investigations. See FOIA Response Letter from Robert A. Muller (Dec. 22,
2015) (Pennsylvania) (on file with author).  As explored in Part II, other privacy leaders
have devoted significant resources to both individual and multistate investigations.
36 See infra notes 375–88 and accompanying text (discussing data security and privacy
enforcement actions and resulting AVCs or consent judgments).
37 Harris Interview, supra note 13.  AG Harris’s first technical consultant was Ashkan
Soltani, who went on to lead the FTC’s Technology Unit. Id.
38 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Ryan Kriger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of the
Att’y Gen. of Vt. (Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Kriger Interview] (explaining that Vermont
AG’s Office has partnered with Norwich University’s computer science department and has
a computer science professor on retainer); Telephone Interview with Paula Selis, Chief of
High Tech Unit, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Wash. (June 30, 2015) [hereinafter Selis
Interview].
39 See, e.g., Kriger Interview, supra note 38.  Vermont Assistant AG Ryan Kriger helped
coordinate the privacy training of forty-four lawyers from offices around the country with
funds from the TJX multistate settlement. See id.
40 See infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing how an FTC report inspired
the New York Attorney General’s Office’s investigation of credit-reporting agencies).
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states’ approach to data security investigations.  As former Maryland Assistant
Attorney General Steven Ruckman explained, the FTC has served as the
“mother ship” on data security issues because it has unique technical know-
how that would be hard to reproduce at the state level.41  AG staff have
looked to the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence in interpreting their own UDAP
laws.42
Privacy has been built into the infrastructure of leading privacy offices.
California has a privacy enforcement and protection unit in the Consumer
Protection Bureau and an e-crime unit in the Criminal Division.43  Illinois
has a privacy and identity theft group in the Consumer Protection Division.44
New York has an Internet bureau with six attorneys and a data security tech-
nologist.45  Ohio and Indiana have identity theft units in their consumer pro-
tection divisions.46  Connecticut was the first to establish an independent
privacy division whose head reports directly to the attorney general.47  Con-
necticut AG George Jepsen started a privacy task force in 2011,48 which was
turned into a separate division in 2015.49  Two full-time attorneys and three
part-time staff work in the Office’s Privacy and Data Security Division.50
41 See Interview with Steven Ruckman, former head of Privacy Unit, Office of the Att’y
Gen. of Md., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Ruckman Interview].
42 See id.  As Part II documents, AG offices have not simply followed the lead of federal
agencies.  In important areas, they have set privacy policy in the absence of federal norms;
in others, they have pressed the FTC to offer greater privacy protections to consumers than
those afforded by federal agencies.  In the near future, there may be more aggressive state
AG privacy and data security enforcement than enforcement activity at the federal level.
43 See Telephone Interview with Joanne McNabb, Chief Privacy Educator, Cal. Att’y
Gen. Privacy Unit (Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter McNabb Interview Mar. 3]; Press Release,
Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Privacy
Enforcement and Protection Unit (July 19, 2012), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-
releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-privacy-enforcement-and-protection.
44 See Office of the Ill. Att’y Gen.: Identity Theft Hotline, ILL. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.illi-
noisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/hotline.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
45 See Telephone Interview with Kathleen McGee, Chief of Internet Bureau, Office of
the Att’y Gen. of N.Y. (Dec. 8, 2015) [hereinafter McGee Interview].
46 See Telephone Interview with Melissa Szozda Smith, Assistant Att’y Gen. and Dir. of
Identity Theft Unit, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ohio (June 30, 2016); Divonne Smoyer &
Paul Bond, Q&A: Indiana AG on Initiatives, Priorities for Privacy Protection, IAPP (May 27,
2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/q-a-indiana-ag-on-initiatives-priorities-for-privacy-protec-
tion/.
47 See George Jepsen, Attorney General: AG’s Focus Ranges from Data Breaches to Health
Care, CONN. L. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202746783002/
Attorney-General-AGs-Focus-Ranges-From-Data-Breaches-to-Health-Care?mcode=0&curin
dex=0.
48 See Christian Nolan, With New Unit, Conn. AG’s Office Ratchets up Focus on Data Breaches,
CONN. L. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202720556511/With-
New-Unit-Conn-AGs-Office-Ratchets-Up-Focus-on-Data-Breaches?slreturn=20160028122
934.
49 See Interview with George Jepsen, Att’y Gen., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., in
Hartford, Conn. (Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Jepsen Interview].
50 Id.
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Having a formal privacy unit or division is not necessary for a state attor-
ney general to take a leading role on consumer privacy matters.  Massachu-
setts has aggressively pursued data security investigations without having a
dedicated privacy unit or division.  Experienced career staff and supportive
attorneys general have been crucial to the office’s work on security and pri-
vacy issues.51  Nonetheless, the creation of privacy units and the hiring of
technical experts have solidified many offices’ commitment to privacy and
data security enforcement.
In the past five years, twenty-seven states have joined one or more multis-
tate investigations spearheaded by privacy pioneers.52  They contribute to
51 This is certainly true of Massachusetts Assistant AG Sara Cable, who worked for AG
Martha Coakley during her tenure (2007–2015) and now works for AG Maura Healey
(2015–present).  Of course, outgoing attorneys general cannot control the agendas of
their successors.  During his tenure, Maryland AG Doug Gansler (2007–2015) established
an Internet Privacy Unit with a special focus on youth privacy. See Ruckman Interview,
supra note 41.  AG Gansler made data privacy his key initiative when serving as president of
NAAG. See Telephone Interview with Douglas Gansler, Former Att’y Gen., Office of the
Att’y Gen. of Md. (Aug. 31, 2016).  When AG Gansler’s term ended, his chief of the
Internet Privacy Unit went into private practice. See Ruckman Interview, supra note 41.
Privacy continues to be a part of the Office’s work, but time will tell if it remains a central
mission of the Office.
52 See, e.g., FOIA Response Letter from Craig W. Richards (Dec. 8, 2012) (Alaska) (on
file with author) (providing materials showing individual and multistate enforcement activ-
ity); FOIA Response Letter from Bethany Diaz (Jan. 12, 2016) (Arizona) (on file with
author) (same); FOIA Response Letter from Stefanie Mann (Dec. 3, 2015) (Colorado) (on
file with author) (providing materials showing it was a signatory to multistate AVCs but not
individual enforcement actions); FOIA Response Letter from Tony Towns (July 26, 2016)
(District of Columbia) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response Email from Mark
Hamilton (Aug. 30, 2016) (Florida) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response Letter
from Stella Kam (Dec. 4, 2015) (Hawaii) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response
Email from Cari Sagar (Oct. 22, 2015) (Iowa) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response
Letter from Cheryl Whalen (Sept. 16, 2015) (Kansas) (on file with author) (providing
materials showing both individual and multistate enforcement activity); Telephone Inter-
view with Lonnie Styron, Office of the Att’y Gen. of La. (Feb. 3, 2016) (Louisiana) (provid-
ing materials showing it was a signatory to multistate AVCs but not individual enforcement
actions); FOIA Response Letter from Linda Conti (Nov. 24, 2015) (Maine) (on file with
author) (same); FOIA Response Letter from Christy Wendling-Richards (July 19, 2016)
(Michigan) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response Letter from James W. Canaday
(Aug. 4, 2016) (Minnesota) (on file with author) (providing materials showing individual
and multistate enforcement activity); FOIA Response Letter from Rochelle Reeves (Feb.
25, 2016) (Missouri) (on file with author) (providing materials showing it was a signatory
to multistate AVCs but not individual enforcement actions); FOIA Response Letter from
Laura Tucker (Sept. 11, 2015) (Nevada) (on file with author) (same); FOIA Response
Email from Liz Brocker (Nov. 24, 2015) (North Dakota) (on file with author) (same);
FOIA Response Letter from Aaron Cooper (Dec. 16, 2015) (Oklahoma) (on file with
author) (same); Telephone Interview with Michael Kron, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Or.
(Jan. 11, 2015) (Oregon) [hereinafter Kron Interview]; FOIA Response Letter from Steven
A. Travis (Dec. 22, 2015) (West Virginia) (on file with author) (providing materials show-
ing individual and multistate enforcement activity); FOIA Response Letter from Paul Fer-
guson (Dec. 18, 2015) (Wisconsin) (on file with author) (providing materials showing
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multistate investigations by providing assistance on discovery review and
other discrete assignments.53  Their offices also have joined forces with pri-
vacy pioneers on education efforts.54  Thus, in both leading and supporting
roles, a sizeable majority of states have been engaged in privacy
enforcement.55
II. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY ENFORCEMENT
This Part shows how important state attorneys general have been to U.S.
privacy regulation.  It sets the stage by introducing the regulatory tools availa-
ble to attorneys general and an office’s potential to shape privacy practices
beyond its borders.  Then, it documents areas where attorneys general have
helped establish privacy and data security protections and areas where they
have harmonized and sharpened existing federal norms.  As this Part high-
lights, attorneys general have been most effective in influencing privacy pol-
icy when they have pursued a combination of regulatory tools.
A. Policymaking Tools and Potential Impact
State attorneys general can influence privacy policy through legislation,
persuasion, and litigation.  Since the 1990s, state AGs have proposed and
endorsed state consumer privacy and data security laws.56  Attorneys general
multistate activity but no individual enforcement actions); FOIA Response Letter from
Ryan Schelhaas (Dec. 1, 2015) (Wyoming) (on file with author) (providing materials show-
ing individual and multistate enforcement activity).  In the past five years, Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia have joined multistate
consumer privacy investigations; for different reasons, they never provided a substantive
response to my FOIA requests. See supra note 15.
53 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Linda Conti, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of the
Att’y Gen. of Maine  (June 22, 2015) [hereinafter Conti Interview] (discussing her contri-
butions to multistate investigations).
54 This is true of Missouri AG Chris Koster who has worked closely with Indiana AG
Greg Zoeller to combat illegal robocalling and more generally to protect telephone pri-
vacy. See Alexandra Kruczek, AG Zoeller Launches National Do Not Call Summit, WLFI NEWS
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://wlfi.com/2014/04/08/ag-zoeller-launches-national-do-not-call-pro-
gram/ (reporting that AG Koster and AG Zoeller have run annual summits devoted to
educating state and federal law enforcers on how to combat Do Not Call violations).
55 In response to FOIA requests, three states explained that they had no consumer
privacy or data security enforcement activity in the past five years.  See FOIA Response
Letter from Daniel Walsh (Nov. 30, 2015) (Georgia) (on file with author); FOIA Response
Email from James Boffetti (Nov. 30, 2015) (New Hampshire) (on file with author); FOIA
Response Letter from Che´ Arguello (Jan. 22, 2016) (Utah) (on file with author).  In May
2016, the attorneys general of Utah and Georgia supported efforts to ban transgender
individuals from using bathrooms designated for the sex of their chosen (but not birth)
identity.  I am grateful to Dissent Doe for pointing that out to me.
56 In many states, attorneys general are authorized to propose legislation. See Colin
Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism,
33 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 37, 39 (2003) (discussing the legislative role of attorneys gen-
eral); Smoyer et al., supra note 6.  Delaware, for instance, recently adopted four privacy
and data security laws proposed by AG Matt Denn. See Press Release, Office of the Att’y
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have extended their legislative agenda to Capitol Hill.57  State AGs, for
instance, routinely testify before congressional committees.58
Persuasion is another way that attorneys general can shape privacy prac-
tices.59  Attorneys general establish task forces with business leaders, advo-
cacy groups, and experts in the hopes that participants reach consensus on
best practices.60  They reach out to companies with concerns about products
and services.61  Staff provide advice to companies.62  The California Attorney
General’s Office, for instance, has offered to review privacy policies.63  In
partnership with a local university’s cyber security department, the Vermont
Attorney General’s Office has offered free penetration tests to businesses to
identify basic security vulnerabilities.64  Connecticut AG George Jepsen
Gen. of Del., Internet Privacy and Safety Agenda Becomes Law with Governor’s Signature
(Aug. 7, 2015), http://news.delaware.gov/2015/08/07/internet-privacy-and-safety-agenda-
becomes-law-with-governors-signature/.  Violations of state privacy and data security laws
are usually considered per se violations of UDAP statutes.
57 See Clayton, supra note 19, at 535.  Attorneys general successfully lobbied to have
authority to enforce federal consumer privacy laws. Id.
58 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Attorney General Submits
Testimony Calling on Congress to Institute Internet Do-Not-Track (Dec. 2, 2010), http://
www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=469312.
59 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 35 (1992); Telephone Interview with Sara Cable, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass. (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Cable Interview]; Fitz-
simmons Interview, supra note 5; Hagan & Van Hise Interview, supra note 5; Kriger Inter-
view, supra note 38; Telephone Interview with Joanne McNabb, Chief Privacy Educator,
Cal. Att’y Gen.’s Privacy Unit (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter McNabb Interview July 20]; Ruck-
man Interview, supra note 41; Selis Interview, supra note 38.
60 See infra notes 182–86 and accompanying text (discussing California AG Kamala
Harris’s reliance on her power to convene to change practices concerning mobile privacy
and exploitation of nonconsensual pornography); see also Divonne Smoyer & Christine
Czuprynski, Q&A: Connecticut AG Talks Privacy Enforcement, Collaboration with the FTC, IAPP
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/qa-connecticut-ag-talks-privacy-enforcement-
collaboration-with-the-ftc/ (explaining how after meetings with Connecticut AG George
Jepsen, Google agreed to review the privacy implications of any app using facial recogni-
tion software on Google Glass).  As Part III explores, informal agreements lack the force of
law, though violations can be the basis of a subsequent lawsuit.  Part III assesses the weak-
nesses of those agreements and prescribes solutions. See infra Part III.
61 See, e.g., Letter from George C. Jepsen, Att’y Gen., State of Conn., to Tim Cook,
CEO, Apple, Inc. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2014/
20140912_applewatchletter.pdf (requesting a meeting to discuss Apple Watch’s storage of
personal and health information and its review of applications’ privacy policies to ensure
safeguarding of users’ health information); Jepsen Interview, supra note 49.
62 See, e.g., Cable Interview, supra note 59.
63 See Vindu Goel, California Urges Websites to Disclose Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES: BITS
BLOG (May 21, 2104, 12:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/california-
urges-websites-to-disclose-online-tracking/?_r=0 (explaining that the California AG’s Office
“would review companies’ privacy policies and work with them to make sure they followed
the new law”).
64 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Vt., Attorney General Sorrell Announces
Vermont Cyber Security Project (July 9, 2012) [hereinafter Vermont Cyber Security Project
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explained it is more efficient to help companies ensure their privacy and
security policies comply with the law than to catch them after they have bro-
ken it.65
Another important strategy is the issuance of best practice guides.66
Guidance documents explain an attorney general’s understanding of privacy
and data security laws.67  They provide examples of practices that would be
considered unfair and deceptive.  In preparing guides, staff consult with
stakeholders from a broad range of interests.68  Massachusetts Assistant AG
Sara Cable explained, “We want companies to tell us how we can be clear
about what we expect and how that clarity can help them satisfy the law and
innovate.”69  Stakeholder meetings can involve dozens of participants: the
goal is to get as many perspectives as possible.70  AG offices educate stake-
holders about best practices.71  The California Attorney General’s Office
held workshops featuring developers talking about how they dealt with pri-
vacy concerns in designing mobile apps.72  Joanne McNabb, the Office’s
Chief Privacy Educator, explained that “a key part of the education process
was having the audience at workshops hear from peers about how they com-
plied with the law.”73
Publicity is another way to encourage compliance.  Attorneys general dis-
cuss privacy and data security lapses with the public to change the social
meaning of problematic behavior.74  To retain consumers’ trust and contain
reputational damage, companies bring their practices into line with the
law.75
Announcement], http://ago.vermont.gov/focus/news/attorney-general-sorrell-announ
ces-vermont-cyber-security-project.php.
65 See Jepsen Interview, supra note 49.  Not all offices, however, have the inclination or
bandwidth to provide retail advice to companies. See, e.g., IDAHO ATT’Y GEN., IDAHO CON-
SUMER PROTECTION MANUAL 5 (2015) [hereinafter IDAHO ATT’Y GEN.], http://www.ag.idaho
.gov/publications/consumer/ConsumerProtectionManual.pdf.
66 See, e.g., McNabb Interview July 20, supra note 59 (discussing how California has
released best practice guides focused on mobile app developers, healthcare providers,
cyber security for small-to-medium businesses, and the development of privacy policies).
Consumers are also the audience for the state’s best practice guides. See id.
67 See id.
68 See, e.g., McNabb Interview Mar. 3, supra note 43.
69 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
70 See, e.g., McNabb Interview July 20, supra note 59.
71 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Vt., Attorney General Sorrell
Announces Data Security For Small Businesses Workshop (Apr. 22, 2013), http://
ago.vermont.gov/focus/news/attorney-general-sorrell-announces-data-security-for-small-
businesses-workshop.php; Vermont Cyber Security Project Announcement, supra note 64
(discussing workshops on cyber security for small businesses held in four counties).
72 See McNabb Interview July 20, supra note 59.
73 Id.
74 See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAL. DATA BREACH REPORT 4 (2014) (discussing entities
reporting more than one breach in 2013, including American Express, Discover Financial
Services, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance, and Kaiser Health).
75 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 35–38.
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When soft-law efforts fail to convince businesses to comply with the law,
attorneys general may turn to litigation.  Their efforts often begin with a
warning letter.  Warning letters routinely influence the behavior of regulated
entities, eliminating the need for further action.76  If not, attorneys general
may initiate a formal investigation.77  Indispensable to any investigation is the
state AG’s authority to obtain discovery before initiating a lawsuit.78  Under
their broad powers of original inquiry, attorneys general can “investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because [they]
want[ ] assurance that it is not.”79  Administrative subpoenas, referred to as
civil investigative demands (CIDs), are crucial to investigations.80  CIDs can
be issued to individuals who are not targets of an investigation if “a reasona-
ble basis exists to believe the non-violator possesses information relevant to
the investigation.”81
Attorneys general often join forces to investigate unfair and deceptive
commercial practices affecting consumers across the country.82  Multistate
investigations are coordinated through NAAG’s Privacy Working Group.83
An attorney general’s office or a group of offices (known as the executive
committee) will lead an investigation.84  In multistate actions, states file sepa-
rate lawsuits, though offices collaborate on aspects of the proceedings.  States
issue similar requests for information, share information through common-
interest agreements, and engage in joint negotiations.85
States—proceeding individually or as a group—often eschew formal
adjudication for informal agreements that close investigations.86  In some
states, the attorney general must give an entity the chance to sign an informal
agreement, often called an assurance of voluntary compliance (AVC), before
pursuing litigation.87  Under an AVC, an entity or individual typically agrees
76 See, e.g., McNabb Interview Mar. 3, supra note 43.
77 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pineur, 533 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Ky. 1976) (“Even if one
were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than
official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy them-
selves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.” (quoting
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950))).
78 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at 232.
79 Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642–43.
80 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at 232–33.
81 Everdry Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Carter, 885 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
82 Attorneys general also undertake investigations with federal agencies. See infra sub-
section III.A.3 (discussing the synergistic relationship between attorneys general and fed-
eral agencies).
83 See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Cong. Leaders (July 7, 2015), http:/
/www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-letter/Final%20NAAG%20Data%20Breach
%20Notification%20Letter.pdf.
84 See Ruckman Interview, supra note 41.
85 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at 246.
86 See Cable Interview, supra note 59.
87 See, e.g., IDAHO ATT’Y GEN., supra note 65, at 4.
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to engage in, or refrain from, certain conduct and to pay a fine and attor-
neys’ fees.88
Attorney general enforcement activity naturally influences private behav-
ior within a state’s borders, but it also can have an impact beyond the state.
Businesses may follow the most restrictive AG-endorsed norms to avoid the
costs of piecemeal compliance.89  This dynamic allows smaller states to
“punch above their weight.”90  By adopting the strictest standards, firms can
operate in all jurisdictions with some assurance about legal compliance.91
Companies have a strong incentive to follow the regulatory standards of
powerful states.92  David Vogel has labeled this phenomenon the “California
effect.”93  As Vogel explains, stronger state standards are more likely to be
adopted if they emanate from powerful jurisdictions and enjoy wide support
from policy groups.94  In recognition of this phenomenon, Attorney General
Harris has said: “If we can strengthen privacy protections here [in Califor-
nia], we can benefit consumers around the world.”95
Attorneys general also influence each other, both in individual efforts
and in multistate investigations on issues of national import.  That is the
upside of state experimentation as imagined by Justice Louis Brandeis:96 pol-
88 Under most AVCs, a broken promise constitutes prima facie evidence of a legal
violation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.16.470 (West 2016) (“[F]ailure to perform
the terms of any such assurance shall constitute prima facie proof of a violation of this
chapter for the purpose of securing an injunction . . . .”).  Attorneys general may sue the
violator, pointing to the broken promise as proof of the underlying lawbreaking.  Some
informal agreements, however, have more teeth: violations, if proven in court, warrant
immediate relief. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Md., AG Gansler
Secures Agreement to Protect Children on Ask.fm (Aug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Ask.fm
Settlement], http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/NewsReleases/2014/
081414.aspx (discussing the assurance of voluntary compliance between Maryland and
Ask.fm).  Part III explores the weaknesses in the typical AVC and offers solutions. See infra
Part III.
89 See Hogan Lovells, California Continues to Shape Privacy and Data Security Standards,
PRIVACY TRACKER (Oct. 1, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/california-contin-
ues-to-shape-privacy-and-data-security-standards.
90 See Jepsen Interview, supra note 49.
91 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 249–50 (1995).
92 See id. at 267–68.
93 Id. at 247–70.
94 See id. at 268.  That bigger states have an advantage over smaller states in this way
raises concerns about “horizontal aggrandizement.” See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforce-
ment of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 751 (2011) (quoting Lynn A. Baker, Putting the
Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 955 (2001)).
95 Jessica Guynn, Facebook to Require Privacy Policies for All Apps in App Center, L.A. TIMES
(June 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/22/business/la-fi-facebook-ag-
20120622 (quoting Attorney General Kamala Harris).
96 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.”).
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icy experiments so successful that they persuade fellow enforcers to follow
suit.97  As former Maine Attorney General James Tierney and former Maine
Solicitor General Peter Brann have noted, there is a “remarkable congruence
that exists between states and state attorneys general when addressing similar
challenges and issues.”98
Then too, attorney general enforcement activity can spur legislative
change.  According to Peter Swire who served as President Bill Clinton’s
Chief Privacy Officer, attorneys general “are why Congress adopted the finan-
cial privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.”99  They
forced federal lawmakers’ hand by suing banks for sharing consumers’ finan-
cial data with third parties without notifying consumers or providing a
chance to opt out.100  Congressman Ed Markey applauded attorneys general
for making clear that financial privacy required a federal response.101
B. Norm Creation
State enforcers have pioneered baseline privacy norms related to privacy
policies, data-breach notification, consumer choice, use restrictions, youth
privacy, sexual privacy, and telephone privacy.  Federal agencies have built
upon some of these norms in their enforcement actions.
1. Transparency of Data Practices
A central principle of data privacy law is that individuals should be noti-
fied when their data is collected, analyzed, shared, and stored.102  Attorneys
97 Lemos, supra note 94, at 751.  As Jessica Bulman-Pozen insightfully explores in her
work, state experimentation does not always follow the same playbook, that is, with states
engaging in self-contained experiments.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1124–25 (2014).  State AGs serve as laboratories of democracy in dif-
ferent ways, including by joining together on national issues.  Experimentation can involve
individual states striking out in unique ways, but it also can involve multistate investigations
on national issues. Id.  Variety is characteristic of AG privacy and data security innovation.
Along those lines, multistate privacy and data security AG efforts do not always follow parti-
san commitments, as is true in other contexts like the environment and healthcare.  They
often garner the support of both Republicans and Democrats.  Although the majority of
the thirteen AG privacy pioneers are Democrats (such as California, New York, and Massa-
chusetts), some are Republicans (such as Texas and Indiana).
98 James E. Tierney & Peter Brann, The Role of the State Attorney General (Fall
2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/attorneys-general/
cls_syllabus_6.10.15.pdf (course syllabus).
99 Interview with Peter Swire, Professor of Law & Ethics, Ga. Inst. of Tech., in Berkeley,
Cal. (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Swire Interview].
100 Id.
101 Congressman Ed Markey offered a privacy amendment to the bill, pointing to Min-
nesota Attorney General Hatch’s lawsuits against banks for sharing customers’ data without
permission. See id.  The Markey amendment—which was adopted—required banks to get
consumers’ opt-in consent before sharing personal data with third parties. See id.
102 A prominent FIPPs principle is the right to have notice about how data will be col-
lected, used, and shared. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 3, at 21–22.
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general have turned the aspiration of notice into a baseline norm by requir-
ing entities to have privacy policies.103  The idea is that in drafting privacy
policies, businesses have to think about, and commit to, certain data prac-
tices.104  Regulators and consumer groups can inspect those policies and
hold companies to their promises; consumers can find out what is happening
with their personal data.105
After failing to persuade technology companies to adopt privacy policies
voluntarily in the late 1990s,106 state attorneys general turned to the
courts.107  In 2001, ten attorneys general sued DoubleClick for using cookies
to track users’ online activities without providing clear notice to consum-
ers.108  Although the FTC dropped its investigation because no promises had
been broken, the states argued that DoubleClick’s failure to make its data
practices transparent constituted an unfair commercial practice.109
DoubleClick ultimately agreed to adopt a privacy policy, allow consumers to
opt out of cookies, and undergo annual privacy audits for three years.110
State attorneys general paired the pursuit of litigation with legislation.
In 2003, California Attorney General William Lockyer proposed the Califor-
nia Online Privacy Protection Act (“CalOPPA”),111 the first state law to
require online services and websites to have privacy policies.112  Most
103 The FTC has never gone so far as to say that not having a policy is a deceptive or
unfair practice. See Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at 599.
Under federal law, only a few sectors of the economy must have a privacy policy, including
financial institutions, healthcare providers, and websites collecting information about chil-
dren under thirteen.
104 See Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8; McNabb Interview of July 20, supra note 59.
105 See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1263, 1266–67 (2002).  Ryan Calo has done important work exploring the importance
of notice and prescribing ways to ensure that it is meaningful. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012).
106 Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8 (explaining that in the late 1990s, the attorneys
general from California, New York, Washington, Texas, and Illinois convened a series of
meetings with Silicon Valley leaders including Sergey Brin and Larry Page).
107 See, e.g., Granholm Targets Online Privacy, MICH. DAILY (Feb. 12, 2001), https://www
.michigandaily.com/content/granholm-targets-online-privacy (explaining that Michigan
Attorney General Jennifer Granholm investigated companies whose privacy policies failed
to explain that third-party advertisers collected information about consumers).
108 See Stephanie Miles, DoubleClick Sets Pact with States, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2002),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1030381164280449795.
109 See John Schwartz, Trade Commission Drops Inquiry of DoubleClick, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/23/technology/23DOUB.html.
110 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Lockyer Gains
Enhanced Privacy Protections in Consumer Protection Cases (Aug. 28, 2002), https://
oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-lockyer-gains-enhanced-privacy-protec-
tions-consumer-protection.
111 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2016).
112 Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8.  Attorneys general have played an important
role in updating those laws. See, e.g., Christine Czuprynski & Divonne Smoyer, Illinois AG
Targets ID Theft, Earlier Breach Notification, IAPP (Apr. 28, 2015), https://privacyassociation
.org/news/a/illinois-ag-targets-id-theft-earlier-breach-notification (discussing the efforts of
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recently, Delaware Attorney General Matt Denn successfully spearheaded leg-
islation requiring privacy policies.113  Attorney General Denn modeled the
law after CalOPPA.114
Recent state enforcement efforts have focused on the mobile ecosystem.
In 2011, nearly three-quarters of mobile applications lacked privacy poli-
cies.115  The FTC’s 2012 report on mobile apps for children found that in
virtually all cases, neither app stores nor app developers informed parents
what data was being collected from their children.116
California Attorney General Kamala Harris spearheaded an initiative to
change this state of affairs.  She convened a working group to discuss how
developers could be encouraged to post privacy policies.  In February 2012,
Attorney General Harris obtained, from the six companies whose platforms
comprise the majority of the mobile apps market, an agreement to display
apps’ privacy policies so that consumers could review the policies before
installing them.117  Her office issued a guidance document urging industry
to build FIPPs into mobile services, including the posting of privacy poli-
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan to update state law to require privacy policies);
Alexandra Ross, Women in Privacy Leadership Roles: Interview with Joanne McNabb, TRUSTE
PRIVACY BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.truste.com/blog/2014/10/24/
women-in-privacy-leadership-roles-interview-with-joanne-mcnabb/ (describing Attorney
General Harris’s efforts to update CalOPPA to ensure that privacy policies address how
they respond to do-not-track signals).
113 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Del., Internet Privacy and Safety
Agenda Becomes Law with Governor’s Signature (Aug. 7, 2015), http://news.delaware
.gov/2015/08/07/internet-privacy-and-safety-agenda-becomes-law-with-governors-signa-
ture/ (explaining that Delaware Attorney General Matt Denn proposed a law mirroring
CalOPPA, which was adopted in 2015).
114 See id.; Telephone Interview with Christian Wright, Chief of Consumer Prot.
Bureau, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Del. (Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Wright Interview].
115 See FPF Staff, FPF Finds Nearly Three-Quarters of Most Downloaded Mobile Apps Lack a
Privacy Policy, FUTURE OF PRIVACY F. (May 12, 2011), https://fpf.org/2011/05/12/fpf-finds-
nearly-three-quarters-of-most-downloaded-mobile-apps-lack-a-privacy-policy/.
116 FTC, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE DISAPPOINTING 2
(2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-cur-
rent-privacy-disclosures-are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
117 See Kamala D. Harris, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Joint Statement of Principles
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n2630_signed_agreement
.pdf.  Amazon, Apple, Google, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, and Research in Motion were
the initial signatories; Facebook signed on in June 2012.
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cies.118  The goal was to align mobile data practices with consumers’ reasona-
ble expectations.119
Soft-law efforts were followed with coercive ones.  Attorney General Har-
ris sent warning letters to 100 companies whose apps lacked privacy poli-
cies.120  The letters demanded compliance with CalOPPA within thirty days
or risk penalties of $2500 per download by a California consumer.121  Attor-
ney General Harris reinforced these warnings on social media.  A tweet from
Attorney General Harris’s verified account said, “Fabulous app, @United Air-
lines, but where is your app’s #privacy policy?”122  The tweet included a link
to CalOPPA.123  Within a day’s time, United Airlines had an easily accessible
mobile privacy policy.124  Attorney General Harris’s office sued Delta Airlines
after a warning letter failed to elicit a response.125
118 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE
ECOSYSTEM 9 (2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_
the_go.pdf.  Relatedly, attorneys general are working on putting “flesh on the bones” of
privacy policies by forging norms concerning their form, timing, and content.  California’s
policy is to have two privacy policies: a succinct privacy policy for consumers and a compre-
hensive one for watchdogs and regulators. See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRI-
VACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 4
(2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_priva
cy_practices_public.pdf; see also Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, People v. Com-
cast, No. RG15786197 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015), (agreeing to provide simple and easy-
to-read disclosures about treatment of unlisted phone numbers and to pay a $25 million
penalty after allegedly posting customers’ personal data even though they paid for unlisted
services).
119 See John Kennedy & Annie Bai, Apps Gone Wild? The FTC and California AG Seek to
Rein in Mobile App Privacy Practices, IAPP (Mar. 1, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/
news/a/2013-03-01-apps-gone-wild-the-ftc-and-california-ag-seek-to-rein-in-mobile.
120 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Kamala D. Har-
ris Notifies Mobile App Developers of Non-Compliance with California Privacy Law (Oct.
30, 2012), http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-noti-
fies-mobile-app-developers-non-compliance.
121 Id.
122 Kamala Harris (@KamalaHarris), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:27 AM), https://twitter
.com/kamalaharris/status/256778084219502592.
123 See AG Tweets to United Airlines: Where’s Your Privacy Policy?, IAPP (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://iapp.org/news/a/2012-10-15-ag-tweets-to-united-airlines-wheres-your-privacy-
policy.
124 Interview with Travis LeBlanc, Chief of the Bureau of Enf’t, FCC, in Wash., D.C.
(July 10, 2015) [hereinafter LeBlanc Interview].
125 Brandon Bailey, California Attorney General Sues Delta Air Lines over Smartphone App
Privacy Policy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/busi-
ness/ci_22141459/california-sues-delta-airlines-over-smartphone-app-privacy.  The com-
plaint was dismissed on the grounds that federal law preempts state actions concerning
airlines and Attorney General Harris’s office appealed the decision. See Bernard Nash et
al., State AGs in the News, STATE AG MONITOR (May 24, 2013), https://web.archive.org/
web/20130708101148/http://www.stateagmonitor.com/2013/05/24/state-ags-in-the-
news-84.  The dismissal was upheld on appeal. See Bob Egelko, Court Says Ca. Privacy Law
Doesn’t Apply to Airlines’ Mobile Apps, SFGATE (May 25, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/Court-says-Ca-privacy-law-doesn-t-apply-to-7946012.php.
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Attorney General Harris’s efforts transformed the transparency of the
mobile app marketplace.  According to John Simpson of Consumer Watch-
dog’s Privacy Project, Attorney General Harris “tam[ed] the Wild West in the
mobile world.”126  “From September 2011 to June 2012, the number of free
Apple Store apps with a privacy policy doubled, from 40 percent to 84
percent.”127
The FTC has attributed the increase in mobile privacy policies to Attor-
ney General Harris’s agreement with platform providers.128  The change,
however, was due to far more than the platforms’ design change.  Attorney
General Harris’s guidance documents and workshops, her issuance of warn-
ing letters, and ultimately her pursuit of litigation helped reinforce the basic
norm that mobile apps must have privacy policies.
In establishing a baseline requirement for privacy policies, state attor-
neys general have paved a path for federal agencies to build upon.  Although
the FTC has never taken the position that section 5 requires companies to
have privacy policies,129 it reinforced the norm set by state attorneys general
by suing companies for deceptively breaking promises made to consumers in
their privacy policies.130
2. Data-Breach Notification
In the 1990s, companies had no legal obligation to notify consumers
about data breaches.  As a result, they had little incentive to improve data
security because data breaches cost them nothing.131  Consumers whose sen-
sitive personal data had been leaked were in the dark: they had no warning
that they should check their credit reports for signs of theft.
State attorneys general supported state data-breach notification propos-
als,132 which were soon adopted across the nation.133  Those laws have been
126 Grant Gross, Mobile Apps Should Limit Data Collection, State AG Says, COMPUTERWORLD
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2493990/mobile-wireless/mo
bile-apps-should-limit-data-collection—state-ag-says.html (quoting e-mail from John Simp-
son, Consumer Watchdog Privacy Project).
127 Kennedy & Bai, supra note 119.
128 See Kristin Cohen & Christina Yeung, Kids’ Apps Disclosures Revisited, FTC BLOG
(Sept. 3, 2015, 11:04 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/
09/kids-apps-disclosures-revisited (endorsing Attorney General Harris’s mobile privacy
proposals).
129 See Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at 599.
130 See id. at 628–30 (discussing FTC enforcement actions based on companies’ broken
promises).
131 Under federal law, breach notification is only required by certain sectors of the
economy, such as covered healthcare providers and financial institutions. See id. at 587.
132 See Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8 (explaining that Attorney General William
Lockyer supported California’s passage of a data-breach notification law).  California was
the first state to pass a data-breach notification law, thanks to the hard work of then-Assem-
blyman Joe Simitian. See E-mail from Deirdre Mulligan, Assoc. Professor, Berkeley Sch. of
Info., to Danielle Citron, Professor of Law, Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of Law
(Aug. 12, 2016) (on file with author).
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kept up to date thanks to the efforts of attorneys general.134  Companies suf-
fering breaches have to provide notice to consumers and to attorney general
offices.135  Attorneys general have defended state breach notification laws
from federal efforts to preempt them.136
State attorneys general have enforced data-breach notification laws, set-
ting norms in the process.  Enforcement actions have fleshed out what
breach notification statutes mean when they require companies to notify con-
sumers “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable
delay.”137
An emerging rule of thumb is that notice should proceed on a rolling
basis.138  California, for instance, sued Kaiser Foundation Health for alleg-
edly waiting four months to notify consumers about a breach, even though
133 Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and several territories now have data-
breach notification laws. See Ronald W. Breaux et al., California AG Cracks Down on Timing
of Data Breach Disclosures, HAYNES BOONE (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.haynesboone.com/
news-and-events/news/alerts/2014/02/05/california-ag-cracks-down-on-timing-of-data-
breach-disclosures.
134 See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT 3 (2014), https://
oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/2014data_breach_rpt.pdf (explaining that
the California legislature adopted Attorney General Harris’s recommendation to update
data security law); Erik C. Jones, Step Aside, States?, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.slate
.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/01/obama_data_breach_legislation_federal
_laws_shouldn_t_pre_empt_state_laws.html (discussing Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan’s lobbying to update breach notification statute).
135 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF CONN., ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2011–2012, at 5 (2012), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/about_us/annualreport2011-12.pdf
(discussing Attorney General Jepsen’s proposal to amend notification law to secure notice
for his office); Selis Interview, supra note 38 (explaining that the Washington attorney
general lobbied to update breach notification law to ensure that companies gave notice to
the office).
136 See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Cong. Leaders (July 7, 2015), http:/
/www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-letter/Final%20NAAG%20Data%20Breach
%20Notification%20Letter.pdf (signed by forty-seven attorneys general, arguing against
preemption of state breach notification laws and emphasizing the important role that
attorneys general play in investigating and enforcing data security lapses); see also Divonne
Smoyer et al., Beware the Growth of State AG Enforcement Efforts, CORP. COUNS. (May 22, 2015),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202727264255/Beware-the-Growth-of-State-AG-Enforce
ment-Efforts.
137 CAL. OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROT., RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF SEC. BREACH
INVOLVING PERS. INFO. 7 (2007), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/laws/priv/Docu-
ments/PrivacyProtection.pdf.
138 See People v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. RG14711370 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb.
10, 2014) (order granting permanent injunction); see also Assurance of Voluntary Compli-
ance, In re Affinity Health Plan, Inc. (Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., Bureau of Consumer
Frauds & Prot. Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Affinity Health Plan AVC] (on file with author)
(agreeing, with the state of New York, to provide notice in most expedient time possible
and to pay $50,000 where company allegedly notified consumers eleven months after dis-
covering breach).
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the company knew the identity of affected consumers two months before.139
In 2014, Kaiser agreed to provide notice of future breaches as soon as a por-
tion of affected consumers could be identified rather than waiting until the
completion of an internal investigation.140
Privacy practitioners predict that the Kaiser agreement will influence
how other state enforcers interpret the timing requirements of their breach
notification laws.141  Time will tell if California’s interpretation of its data-
breach notification law is adopted elsewhere.  California’s approach may
have spillover effects as companies adopt it to avoid the costs of piecemeal
compliance.
In sum, state enforcers—through legislation and litigation—have
changed how companies respond to inadequate data security.  Notification of
breaches has allowed state and federal enforcers to investigate whether inad-
equate security was responsible for countless data leaks.142
3. Respecting Consumer Choice
Do-not-track settings on browsers prevent advertisers from tracking con-
sumers’ online activities.  What happens if online providers ignore consum-
ers’ privacy settings?  What if they have promised to respect consumers’
settings but fail to keep those promises?
Attorneys general have set precedent that bypassing a consumer’s pri-
vacy settings is, in itself, an unfair practice.  This precedent emerged from an
investigation of Google and the advertising firm PointRoll.  Google’s privacy
policy promised that the privacy settings of users’ browsers would be
honored.143  Nevertheless, Google and PointRoll placed third-party cookies
on Safari users’ browsers whose default settings signaled that they should not
be tracked.144  Google deployed a program that invisibly simulated the user
changing the default setting by clicking on the “track me” instruction.145
139 See Complaint at 2, People v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. RG14711370
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/kai-
ser_complaint.pdf?.
140 See People v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. RG14711370 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb.
10, 2014) (order granting permanent injunction).
141 See, e.g., Matthew Staples, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Settles California Attorney Gen-
eral Charges over Delayed Data Breach Notification, EYE ON PRIVACY (Mar. 2014), https://www
.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/eye-on-privacy/Mar2014/index.html.
142 See infra note 235 (discussing data security actions involving failure to provide
notice in a timely fashion).
143 See Warwick Ashford, Google Reaches $17M Multi-State Settlement over Safari Snooping,
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240209285/
Google-reaches-17m-multi-state-settlement-over-Safari-snooping.
144 See Wendy Davis, PulsePoint To Pay $1 Million for Safari Hack, MEDIA POST (July 26,
2013), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/205448/pulsepoint-to-pay-1-mil-
lion-for-safari-hack.html?edition=.
145 Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Google’s iPhone Tracking, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702048804045772253804
56599176.  As Chris Hoofnagle explained, “It was as if a Google engineer grabbed the
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The incident drew the attention of federal and state authorities.  The
FTC’s case singled out Google, focusing on the company’s broken promise to
consumers.146  In a consent decree with the FTC, Google agreed to erase the
cookies it had placed on users’ computers.147  The consent decree, however,
placed no prohibition on Google’s future behavior.148  In short, the FTC
pursued thin protections for consumers based on the agency’s long history of
using section 5 to ensure that companies live up to their promises in privacy
policies.149
The FTC invited a group of thirty-nine attorneys general investigating
Google to join the consent decree.150  The multistate group, however,
declined the FTC’s invitation because it was far more interested in injunctive
relief.151  For the attorneys general, the enforcement action was not about
broken promises, though promises had been broken.152  More important to
them was the surreptitious manipulation of consumers’ browsers to turn on
tracking in contravention of their settings.153  As the multistate investigation
of Google continued, a smaller group of attorneys general pursued an investi-
gation of PointRoll for placing cookies on consumers’ Safari browsers despite
their settings indicating that cookies should be blocked.154
Although the multistate investigations of Google and PointRoll were
resolved separately, the substance of the resulting AVCs was the same.
Google and PointRoll were prohibited from bypassing consumers’ privacy
settings unless they received consumers’ affirmative, or opt-in, consent.155
The message from the states was that evading privacy controls—includ-
ing default privacy controls—is unfair and perhaps even deceptive, whether
user’s mouse and clicked on a ‘track me’ button while the user was not watching.” HOOF-
NAGLE, supra note 2, at 350.
146 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 2, at 338.
147 Press Release, FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Misrep-
resented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-set-
tle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
148 See id.
149 See Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at 628–30 (discuss-
ing FTC’s pursuit of thin norms based on enforcement of promises).
150 See Ruckman Interview, supra note 41.  The ten-state executive committee included
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Vermont, and
Washington. Id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York participated in
the PointRoll investigation. See, e.g., Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re PointRoll,
Inc. (Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Comm’r of Consumer Prot. Dec. 10, 2014) [herein-
after PointRoll AVC] (on file with author).
155 See Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Google (Office of the Att’y Gen. of
Conn., Comm’r of Consumer Prot. Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with author) (an agreement
between thirty-nine attorneys general and Google).
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or not any promises are broken.156  Acting New Jersey Attorney General John
Hoffman explained: “People have every right to surf the Web without fear
that businesses are employing technical tricks to bypass their privacy
settings.”157
The broader impact of the informal agreements with Google and Poin-
tRoll is unclear.  An open question is whether other companies will internal-
ize the norm to honor consumers’ privacy settings—whether or not promises
were made—because circumventing consumers’ privacy choices would be
unfair.
If attorneys general want to ensure that companies respect consumers’
privacy settings, they should reinforce that norm with all tools available to
them.  Attorneys general have not yet proposed or advocated for legislation
requiring companies to respect consumers’ privacy settings.158  They would
do well to reinforce the standard set in the Google and PointRoll matters
with supportive legislation, education efforts, and additional enforcement
activity.
4. Use Restrictions
Consumer privacy law is often silent on the question of how companies
may use personal data that has been collected legally.159  This is because
norms surrounding use restrictions are hotly contested.160  Attorneys general
156 See Justin Brookman, State Attorneys General: Evading Privacy Settings Is Illegal, CDT
BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/state-attorneys-general-evading-privacy-set-
tings-is-illegal/.  As Illinois Assistant Attorney General Matt Van Hise explained, the attor-
neys general based their investigation of PointRoll on the premise that it was
fundamentally unfair to nullify a consumer’s choice not to be tracked.  Hagan & Van Hise
Interview, supra note 5.
157 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.J., N.J. Leads Multi-State Settlement
Resolving Allegations That Digital Ad Co. Breached Internet Privacy Settings (Dec. 11,
2014), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases14/pr20141211c.html.  An important question,
taken up in Part III, is whether AVCs, as currently conceived, are the most effective vehicle
to shape norms. See infra Part III.
158 Attorney General Harris supported an amendment to CalOPPA, which requires
companies to notify consumers about their response to do-not-track settings. See Lei Shen,
Unpacking the California AG’s Guide on CalOPPA, IAPP (May 27, 2014), https://iapp.org/
news/a/unpacking-the-california-ags-guide-on-caloppa/.  The amendment, however, said
nothing about companies’ substantive obligations to honor consumers’ choices.  Similarly,
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan lobbied to amend state privacy law to require pri-
vacy policies to notify consumers about entities’ response to do-not-track settings. See
Czuprynski & Smoyer, supra note 112.
159 Alex Schneider, How Could They Know That? Behind the Data That Facilitates Scams
Against Vulnerable Americans, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 716, 750–51 (2015); see Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16–17 (2014).  Discrimination law, of course, speaks to illegal uses of personal data.
Id.  For instance, the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act forbids discrimination in lend-
ing. Id.
160 Schneider, supra note 159, at 750–51.
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have entered the fray by limiting the use of certain personal data to deny
financial services to consumers.
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman spearheaded an investi-
gation into the major banks’ use of a company’s database containing infor-
mation about individuals with less than perfect banking records.161  The
investigation revealed that when individuals were included in the database,
they were prevented from opening bank accounts, even if they had immedi-
ately paid back money they owed or bounced a single check years before.162
In that regard, the database was used as a blacklist.163  Once denied banking
services, lower-income applicants often turned to high-cost alternatives like
check-cashing outlets.164
Three major banks, Santander, Capital One, and Citibank, agreed to
refrain from using the database (and others like it) to deny banking services
so that no one is rejected for isolated or minor mistakes.165  The agreement
applied to the banks’ offices nationwide.  Practitioners have warned financial
service providers to consider the possibility that they could face an enforce-
ment action for using the company’s database.166  The broader norm-setting
work of the informal agreement remains to be seen.
More generally, use restrictions are on the enforcement agenda of state
attorneys general.167  Under consideration is whether there should be restric-
tions on uses of health data held by sites and services that are not covered by
161 See Mitch Lipka, Consumer Groups Cheer Move to Rein in Banking “Blacklist”, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/consumer-groups-cheer-
move-to-rein-in-banking-blacklist/.
162 Santander Agrees to Change ChexSystems Policies, Which Kept Many from Obtaining Bank
Accounts, FOX BUS. NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2015/02/
20/santander-agrees-to-change-chexsystems-policies-which-kept-many-from-obtaining/.
163 Danielle Citron, The Blacklist’s Power, FORBES (June 17, 2014), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/06/17/the-blacklists-power/#2715e4857a0b138390be5c
9c.
164 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Com-
mitment by Citibank to Eliminate Barriers That Unfairly Keep Low-Income Americans
from Opening Checking and Savings Accounts (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-commitment-citibank-eliminate-barriers-unfair
ly-keep-low.
165 Santander Agrees to Change ChexSystems Policies, Which Kept Many from Obtaining Bank
Accounts, supra note 162.  Citibank agreed that applications only could be denied if individ-
uals have two or more reported incidents of account abuse, the total loss from those inci-
dents exceeds $500, and the losses remain unpaid. CHI CHI WU & KATIE PLAT, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CITIES FOR FIN. EMPOWERMENT FUND, ACCOUNT SCREENING CON-
SUMER REPORTING AGENCIES: A BANKING ACCESS PERSPECTIVE 18 (2015), https://www.nclc
.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/Account-Screening-CRA-Agencies-BankingAccess101915.pdf.
166 New York AG, Capital One Agree on Credit Screening Changes, MANATT, PHELPS & PHIL-
LIPS, LLP (July 18, 2014), https://www.manatt.com/Insights/Newsletters/Financial-Ser-
vices-Law/Holder-Vows-To-Continue-Operation-Choke-Point;-Hou#Article5.
167 Jepsen Interview, supra note 49.
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federal health privacy law.168  Because norms surrounding use restrictions
are not well settled, attorneys general are proceeding with caution.
5. Sexual Privacy
Until 2014, if someone’s nude image appeared online without permis-
sion, little could be done.169  Websites routinely ignored requests to take
down nude images because they enjoyed immunity from liability for user-
generated content under federal law; law enforcement turned away victims,
urging them to turn off their computers rather than make a big deal about
it.170  All the while, victims had difficulty finding and keeping jobs because
their nude images and contact information appeared prominently in online
searches of their names.171  They were terrified that strangers would con-
front them in person.172  They moved; some changed their names; all were
distraught.  The fallout was devastating.173
California Attorney General Kamala Harris has fought for the adoption
of baseline practices that combat invasions of sexual privacy.174  Attorney
General Harris sponsored bills giving law enforcement the tools to investigate
and prosecute invasions of sexual privacy.175  She convened meetings with
major Internet companies, including Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo,
and Google, urging them to consider adopting policies permitting the
removal of nude images posted without consent.176  Attorney General Harris
168 See, e.g., Letter from George C. Jepsen, Att’y Gen., State of Conn., to Tim Cook,
CEO, Apple, Inc. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2014/
20140912_applewatchletter.pdf (requesting a meeting to discuss privacy risks of Apple
Watch).  Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan has raised concerns about health websites
like WebMD and Weight Watchers.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ill., Madigan:
Popular Health Websites Must Ensure Privacy of Users’ Health Information (July 12,
2013), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2013_07/20130712.html.  Paul
Ohm has done important work calling for privacy regulation that provides greater protec-
tion for sensitive data. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015).
169 Danielle Keats Citron, Revenge Porn Should Be a Crime, CNN (Aug. 29, 2013), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/.
170 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 20 (2014).
171 Id. at 181.
172 Id. at 202.
173 Danielle Citron, Attorney General Kamala Harris to Help Law Enforcement in Investiga-
tions of Criminal Invasions of Sexual Privacy, LAW ENF’T CYBER CTR. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://
www.iacpcybercenter.org/the-groundbreaking-work-of-attorney-general-kamala-harris-to-
help-law-enforcement-in-investigations-of-criminal-invasions-of-sexual-privacy/.
174 Id.  I have served as an adviser to Attorney General Harris and her executive team
on revenge porn, harassment, and privacy since the fall of 2014.
175 Cyber Exploitation, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL., https://oag.ca.gov/cyberex-
ploitation (last visited Sept. 27 2016).
176 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris,
Tech Leaders, and Advocates Launch Offensive in Fight Against Cyber Exploitation (Oct.
14, 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-tech-
leaders-and-advocates-launch-offensive.  In February 2015, Attorney General Harris con-
vened a Task Force meeting with technology companies, law enforcement liaisons, advo-
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organized a Cyber Exploitation Task Force made up of victim advocates, fifty
major technology companies, law enforcement representatives, and
experts.177  The Task Force worked on strategies for educating law enforce-
ment and best practices for online platforms.178
Attorney General Harris’s efforts influenced the practices of online
intermediaries, including search engines and social networks.  After sus-
tained public conversation about nonconsensual pornography and participa-
tion in the Task Force, Google and Microsoft agreed to remove nude images
from searches of victims’ names upon their request.179  Twitter banned the
nonconsensual posting of someone’s nude images.180  Facebook clarified its
nudity ban with a detailed explanation of the difference between nudity
addressing social issues like photos of mastectomies, which are permitted,
and images of buttocks and genitals posted without the subject’s permission,
which are banned.181  Attorney General Harris created an online hub provid-
ing resources for law enforcement, victims, and companies interested in
addressing invasions of sexual privacy, harassment, and stalking.182
Important precedent has also been set concerning the operation of sites
that extort money from victims of nonconsensual pornography.183  In her
cacy groups, and experts in her San Francisco office.  As an adviser to Attorney General
Harris, I spoke at the meeting, describing cyber exploitation, its various forms and impact,
and ways to combat it.
177 Joe Mullin, California AG Goes All-Out to Fight “Revenge Porn”, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 14,
2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/california-ag-goes-all-out-to-fight-
revenge-porn/.  In October 2015, Attorney General Harris held a press conference in Los
Angeles announcing the rollout of the cyber exploitation hub, at which I spoke. Cal AG
Harris Launches Cyber Exploitation Initiative, ILC CYBER REPORT (Oct. 14, 2015), https://ilc-
cyberreport.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/cal-ag-harris-launches-cyber-exploitation-initia-
tive/.
178 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Technology Industry Leaders and
Lawmakers Express Support for Attorney General Kamala D. Harris’s New Initiative to
Combat Crime of Cyber Exploitation (Oct. 14, 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-
releases/technology-industry-leaders-and-lawmakers-express-support-attorney-general.
179 Jessica Guynn, Google to Remove ‘Revenge Porn’ from Search Results, USA TODAY (June
19, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/06/19/google-revenge-porn-
search-results/28983363/; Patrick Howell O’Neill, Microsoft Joins Google in Censoring Revenge
Porn, DAILY DOT (July 22, 2015), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/microsoft-ban-revenge-
porn-bing-xbox-live-onedrive/.
180 Ema O’Connor, California Launches New Way for “Revenge Porn” Victims to Strike Back,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/emaoconnor/california-helps-
revenge-porn-victims-strike-back#.uqB6rAzoV; Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter Updates Its Rules to
Specifically Ban ‘Revenge Porn’, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/11/twitter-updates-its-rules-to-specifically-ban-
revenge-porn/.
181 Evan Selinger, How to Defeat Internet Bullies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0327/How-to-defeat-
Internet-bullies.
182 Cyber Exploitation, supra note 175.
183 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Kamala D. Har-
ris Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Website Operator (Dec. 10, 2013), http://oag.ca
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capacity as California’s “top cop,”184 Attorney General Harris successfully
prosecuted operators of sites that encouraged users to post nude photos and
charged for their removal.185  For instance, the operator of UGotPosted,
Kevin Bollaert, faced charges of extortion, conspiracy, and identity theft for
allegedly urging users to post their ex-lovers’ nude photos and then charging
individuals up to $350 for the removal of a photo.186  Bollaert’s conviction
signaled that extorting money from individuals whose confidential nude
images were posted without permission is an illegal enterprise.187
The FTC followed Attorney General Harris’s lead by bringing an
enforcement action against revenge porn site operator Craig Brittain.188
The FTC’s charges focused on the site’s solicitation of individuals’ nude
photos and contact information and the disclosure of that information to the
public.189  The FTC argued that it was unfair for Brittain to exploit nude
images shared in confidence for commercial gain.190  In the consent decree,
Brittain pledged not to disclose anyone’s nude images online without first
getting express written consent.191  Here again, it was state attorney general
enforcement setting precedent protecting sexual privacy, which the FTC
emulated under its section 5 authority.
6. Youth Privacy
Teenagers—youth between thirteen and eighteen years old—are vulner-
able to exploitation when their personal data is collected, analyzed, and
shared.  Nonetheless, federal privacy law provides little protection to children
.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-arrest-revenge-porn-
website-operator.  Christopher Bollaert was tried before a jury in late 2014 and convicted in
February 2015.  Andie Adams & Candice Nguyen, San Diego Man Convicted of Extortion, ID
Theft in ‘Revenge Porn’ Case, NBC SAN DIEGO (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/
news/local/Kevin-Bollaert-Convicted-in-Revenge-Porn-Case-Website-290593621.html.
184 Not all attorneys general have authority over criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 4, at 307–10.  The California Attorney
General’s Office has that power.  See id. at 312.
185 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris
Announces Three-Year Sentence for Cyber Exploitation Website Operator (June 8, 2015),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-
three-year-sentence-cyber.
186 Danielle Citron, Can Revenge Porn Operators Go to Prison?, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2015/01/17/can-revenge-porn-operators-go-
to-jail/#2953b3ca53ca; see also Adams & Nguyen, supra note 183.
187 Danielle Citron & Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision That Could Finally Kill the Revenge-
Porn Business, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/02/the-decision-that-could-finally-kill-the-revenge-porn-business/385113/.
188 Press Release, FTC, Website Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’ Business
After FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude Photos (Jan. 29, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2015/01/website-operator-banned-revenge-porn-business-after-
ftc-charges.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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who are thirteen and older.192  Attorneys general have endeavored to protect
the privacy of teenagers.  Recent attorney general efforts have focused on the
adoption of laws limiting the commercial use of student data collected by
education technology companies.193
Teenagers’ social media interactions have attracted the attention of
attorneys general, particularly as to child predators and cyber bullying.  In
2006, forty-nine attorneys general formed a task force to investigate
predators’ use of social networks to contact teenagers.194  At the time, MyS-
pace was a main site of teen interaction.  MySpace agreed to improve its pri-
vacy features.195  Pursuant to the AVC, the default setting for profiles of users
under eighteen would be “private,” so only established friends could visit
their pages.  Friend requests from users over eighteen could be sent to users
under sixteen only if requesters knew the users’ last names or email
addresses.  Even if users under sixteen overrode the privacy settings, their
profiles would still only be viewable by other uses under eighteen.196  The
company agreed to undergo biannual audits of their consumer complaint
192 The federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act places certain conditions on
the collection of data from children who are twelve and under when they are online.  Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,247, 13,248 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codi-
fied at 16 C.F.R. § 312).  During the FTC’s rulemaking process to update the law, child
privacy advocates urged the FTC to expand COPPA’s definition of “child” to include ado-
lescents. THE PUB. HEALTH ADVOCACY INST., PRIVACY: STATE LAW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS
DIGITAL FOOD MARKETING TO YOUTH 40 (2013), http://www.phaionline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/12/DigitalMktgFullReportPDF.pdf.  The FTC declined to do so. Id.
193 The Delaware Attorney General’s Office is currently working on a rulemaking
related to its new student privacy law.  Wright Interview, supra note 114. See KAMALA D.
HARRIS, CAL. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, READY FOR SCHOOL: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ED TECH
INDUSTRY TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF STUDENT DATA (2016), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/ready-for-school-1116.pdf?  (laying out best practices for
education technology companies collecting, using, and storing sensitive student data,
including medical histories, social and emotional assessments, child welfare or juvenile
justice system involvement, progress reports, location data, and test results, in light of the
adoption of new California student data privacy laws).  In 2005, forty-two attorneys general
alleged that it was a deceptive trade practice to ask high school students to fill out surveys
implying they were meant for colleges and universities when in fact they were given to
advertisers.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., States Settle with Student Data
Collection Company (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/states-settle-stu-
dent-data-collection-company.  The company settled with the states, agreeing to give par-
ents and students the opportunity to opt out of participation in the survey. Id.
194 Adam Thierer, The MySpace-AG Agreement: A Model Code of Conduct for Social Network-
ing?, (Progress & Freedom Found., Paper No. 15.1, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092206; see also Divonne Smoyer, State Attorneys General as U.S. Pri-
vacy Regulators: Q&A with Maryland AG Doug Gansler, IAPP (Jan. 28, 2014), https://iapp
.org/news/a/state-attorneys-general-as-u-s-privacy-regulators-q-a-with-maryland-attorn/.
195 Thierer, supra note 194.
196 MySpace & Attorneys General, Joint Statement on Key Principles of Social Network-
ing Sites Safety, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN. (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.naag.org/assets/
files/pdf/20080115.Joint%20Statement%20on%20Key_Principles_of_Social_Networking_
Sites_Safety.pdf.
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handling and response procedures.197  More recently, in agreements with
Maryland and New York, the anonymous social network Ask.fm has pledged
to adopt a comprehensive risk management plan and program, including the
hiring of a trust and safety officer.198
7. Telephone Privacy
Attorneys general were central to the establishment of state Do Not Call
registries.  Even before a federal Do Not Call list was established,199 states
created their own registries.200  After the adoption of a federal Do Not Call
registry, states supplemented federal law with stronger protections for con-
sumers.  State Do Not Call laws have been extended to cellphones.201
A number of states have aggressively enforced federal and state Do Not
Call laws.  Since 2002, the Indiana Attorney General’s Office has obtained
314 settlements with, or judgments against, telemarketers, resulting in awards
totaling more than $22 million, which has reduced the number of
telemarketing calls made to state citizens.202  Indiana Attorney General Greg
197 Id.
198 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Md., AG Gansler Secures Agreement to
Protect Children on Ask.fm (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/
Pages/NewsReleases/2014/081414.aspx; see also Michael Bodley, Ask.fm, Attorney General
Reach Agreement to Keep Children Safer Online, BALT. SUN (Aug. 14, 2014), http://arti-
cles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-14/business/bs-bz-ask-fm-20140814_1_ask-fm-gansler-
maryland-attorney-general.
199 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) placed restrictions
telemarketing and robocallers.  47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).  Under the TCPA, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) was directed to create a national Do Not Call
database for persons wishing to opt out of telemarketing calls. Id.  The FCC, however,
determined, incorrectly, that the TCPA does not apply to calls from government contrac-
tors. Telemarketing and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO.
CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/telemarketing/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).  In 2003, the
federal Do-Not-Call Implementation Act (DNCA) established the FTC’s Do Not Call Regis-
try to facilitate compliance with the TCPA.  15 U.S.C. § 6151 (2012).  That statute did not
preempt state Do Not Call laws with stronger restrictions.  47 U.S.C. § 227.
200 Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller explained that Missouri was the first state to
pass a Do Not Call law.  Telephone Interview with Ind. Att’y Gen. Greg Zoeller (July 8,
2016) [hereinafter Zoeller Interview].  While working on a Do Not Call bill as the Deputy
Attorney General to then-Indiana Attorney General Nixon, Greg Zoeller talked to the Mis-
souri Attorney General’s Office about the strengths and weaknesses of its bill. Id.  Crucial
to Zoeller was that there be no exemptions included in Indiana’s Do Not Call bill, such as
the preexisting relationship exemption in the Missouri law that permitted a significant
number of unwanted marketing calls to consumers. Id.  Indiana’s legislature passed the
strongest state Do Not Call law, thanks to lobbying by Attorneys General Nixon and Zoel-
ler. Id.
201 See, e.g., Andrew B. Lustigman, Indiana Do Not Call List Extends to Include Mobile Num-
bers, ADVERT. LAW BLOG (May 27, 2011), http://www.olshanlaw.com/blogs-Advertising-Law-
Blog,Indiana-Do-Not-Call-Mobile.
202 ECTV Indiana, AG Zoeller Files Lawsuit Against California Telemarketer Accused of Robo-
calling Violating Do Not Call List, FACEBOOK (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/
ECTVNEWS/posts/374351109381928.
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Zoeller and Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster have also led an annual
Do Not Call training for states and federal agencies.
Recent attorney general efforts have focused on reversing a change to
the federal Telephone Consumer Privacy Act (TCPA), which exempts federal
debt collectors from Do Not Call obligations.203  In May 2016, Attorney Gen-
eral Zoeller testified that the recent TCPA amendments undermined his
state’s tough Do Not Call law by legitimizing robocalls from debt collec-
tors.204  Along with twenty-four state attorneys general, Attorney General
Zoeller called upon Congress to defend the telephone privacy rights of citi-
zens by passing the HANGUP Act, which would reinstate the application of
Do Not Call laws to debt collectors.205  In 2015, Attorney General Zoeller
succeeded in convincing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
permit phone companies to implement call blocking technology; his office,
on behalf of forty-five other attorneys general, urged the major phone com-
panies to adopt such call-blocking technology.
Through legislation, education, and enforcement, state attorneys gen-
eral have set norms protecting consumers’ telephone privacy.  Over the
years, their policymaking has made a significant difference in combating
intrusive and unwanted phone calls.
C. Norm Reinforcement
Along with norm-setting work, state attorneys general have entrenched
and, at times, augmented established data security and privacy norms set at
the federal level.  This Section explores how.
1. Federal Privacy Statutes
Federal privacy regulations related to healthcare, children’s online activ-
ities, and credit reporting agencies are enforceable by state and federal
authorities.206  Attorneys general have taken up the mantle of enforcement
with vigor.  Precedent set by federal agencies has guided their investigations
of alleged violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
203 The TCPA amendment allows debt collection robocalls to people’s cell phones if
the debt is owned or guaranteed by the United States.  47 U.S.C. § 227.  Crucially, it
preempts stronger state laws prohibiting unsolicited cellphone calls by federal debt
collectors.
204 Testimony of Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller: TCPA and HANGUP Act, Before the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Greg Zoeller, Ind.
Att’y Gen.), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/a8cddd55-39e8-4085-
9043-3dd67ffa7b54/88D45DDDB5D28C4D241FC363E11B96B7.zoeller-testimony.pdf.
205 Id.
206 NAAG played an important role in lobbying for concurrent enforcement power for
federal privacy statutes.  Provost, supra note 56, at 39.
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Act (HIPAA),207 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),208 and the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).209
Connecticut was the first state to sue a healthcare provider for failing to
secure health data as required by HIPAA.210  When the Department of
Health and Human Service’s Office of Civil Rights does HIPAA training for
staff at offices of attorneys general, it uses Connecticut’s litigation of the case
as the exemplar of how to bring a HIPAA action.211  New York, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Texas and Vermont have brought HIPAA cases as well.212
Attorneys general have fought for credit-reporting agencies to comply
with the basic requirements of FCRA.  The three major credit-reporting
agencies recently agreed to improve the accuracy of credit reports, to
enhance the fairness of procedures for resolving consumer disputes about
errors, and to protect consumers from unfair harm to their credit histories in
connection with medical debt.213  New York initiated its investigation of the
credit-reporting agencies after the FTC released a study finding that twenty-
207 In 2009, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HI-TECH Act) authorized state attorneys general to enforce HIPAA.  Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. Law No. 111-5, §§ 13001–424, 123
Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj–300jj-51, 17901–53).
208 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
209 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,247 (Mar. 15, 2006)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2012)).
210 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Attorney General Sues Health Net
for Massive Security Breach Involving Private Medical Records and Financial Information
on 446,000 Enrollees (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=453
918.
211 Fitzsimmons Interview, supra note 5; Jepsen Interview, supra note 49.  In its settle-
ment with Connecticut, HealthNet agreed to provide consumers with two years of credit
monitoring, $1 million of identity theft insurance, and reimbursement for the costs of
security freezes.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Attorney General
Announces Health Net Settlement Involving Massive Security Breach Compromising Pri-
vate Medical and Financial Info (July 6, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=23
41&Q=462754.
212 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., Civ. No. 14-3627 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014); State v. Innova Hosp., No. 2010CI-13714 (Tex. Cty. Ct. Oct. 11,
2010); State v. HealthNet, Civ. No. 2:11-CV-16 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011); Press Release,
Office of the Att’y Gen. of Md., Eye Care Retailer Settles in Data Security Lapse (Aug. 19,
2015), https://mdoag-public.sharepoint.com/press/2015/081915.pdf; Press Release,
Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with University
of Rochester to Prevent Future Patient Privacy Breaches (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.ag.ny
.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-university-rochester-prevent-
future-patient.
213 See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., AG Schneiderman Announces
Groundbreaking Consumer Protection Settlement with the Three National Credit Report-
ing Agencies (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
announces-groundbreaking-consumer-protection-settlement-three-national; see also
AnnaMaria Andriotis, Credit-Reporting Giants Agree to Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-reporting-giants-agree-to-overhaul-1425873884.
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six percent of consumers had errors in their credit reports.214  Subsequently,
thirty-one attorneys general, led by Ohio, entered into a separate agreement
with the three credit-reporting agencies under similar terms.215
Attorneys general have strengthened the privacy protections accorded
children under COPPA, which requires website operators to obtain verified
parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information
collected from children under thirteen.216  COPPA does not limit the type of
data that can be collected from children.217  Texas has sharpened COPPA’s
protections in cases against app providers that collected location data from
children without telling their parents.  Agreements included injunctive relief
forbidding app providers from collecting location data from children under
thirteen, whether or not parents provided consent.218
2. Data Security
Attorneys general have been active “first responders” to data breaches
involving entities that are not regulated by federal privacy laws.219  State
214 Consumer Fin. Servs. Grp., NY Attorney General Enters into Far-Reaching Settlement with
Largest Credit-Reporting Agencies, BALLARD SPAHR (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr
.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-03-19-ny-attorney-general-enters-into-far-reach-
ing-settlement-with-largest-credit-reporting.aspx.
215 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ohio, Attorney General DeWine
Announces Major National Settlement with Credit Reporting Agencies (May 20, 2015),
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/May-2015/Attorney-General-
DeWine-Announces-Major-National-S; see also Jim McCabe, Angela E. Kleine & Sarah
Nicole Davis, De´ja` Vu: State AG Consumer Reporting Settlement Follows Landmark New York Agree-
ment, MORRISON FOERSTER (May 26, 2015), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/Client
Alert/2015/05/150526StateAGConsumerSettlement.pdf.
216 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,247 (Mar. 15, 2006)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2012)).
217 Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 20,
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-fre-
quently-asked-questions#General Questions (explaining that operators under COPPA must
provide notice to parents before collecting personal information from children, give par-
ents the choice of consenting to collection and internal use of a child’s information, and
give parents the opportunity to prevent further use or online collection of a child’s per-
sonal information); see also Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at
603.
218 State v. Sun Ground, No. D-1-GV-14-000021 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2014) (order
approving assurance of voluntary compliance); State v. Ploosh LLC, No. D-1-GV-13-001273
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2013) (order approving assurance of voluntary compliance); Chil-
dren’s Apps Collected Personal Information, FOX SAN ANTONIO NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://
foxsanantonio.com/news/tech/childrens-apps-collected-personal-information-11-06-2015
(discussing the Texas Attorney General’s cases against children’s app developers and
agreements not to collect location data).
219 Christopher R. Nolen, State Attorneys General Offer Perspectives on Data Breaches, LEX-
OLOGY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54a5a467-747b-
4d85-ad1d-3fafade085b79 (“[T]he state attorney general is the ‘front-line’ regulator deal-
ing with companies that have suffered data privacy breach incidents.”).
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enforcement activity has been pursued under state data security,220 data dis-
posal,221 encryption,222 breach notification,223 and UDAP laws.224
The FTC has embraced a process-based approach to data security, which
entails assessing steps taken by entities to achieve “reasonable security.”225
Multistate AVCs and settlement agreements have emulated the FTC’s
approach.226  An added benefit of state enforcement is that attorneys general
can seek civil penalties for data security violations under UDAP and other
state statutes.227
220 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016); Standards for the Protection of
Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00
(2010).
221 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471 (2015); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/40 (West 2012); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 931, § 2.
222 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(a)(3) (requiring encryption for Social Security
numbers); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-470.
223 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.
224 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-110a–110q.
225 Thomas J. Smedinghoff, An Overview of Data Security Legal Requirements for All Business
Sectors (Oct. 8, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2671323.  That approach assesses whether
entities have a security program, engage in periodic risk assessments, provide adequate
training to employees, have plans to deal with potential breaches, ensure that outside data
vendors secure data, and employ technical, physical, and administrative safeguards. Id.
The process-based approach was adopted by Massachusetts in its data security regulations.
See generally 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2010).
226 See, e.g., People v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt. LLC, No. RG15786197 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) (order granting permanent injunction) (noting parties’ agree-
ment that defendant would strengthen restrictions on vendors); People v. Payday Loan
Store of Ill., Inc., No. 10CH44962 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012) (notice of dismissal by agree-
ment) (including parties’ agreement that defendant would provide employee training and
adopt policy on destruction of data); State v. Villarreal, No. 2010-CI-13625 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 26, 2010) (order granting permanent injunction) (noting parties’ agreement that
defendant would adopt comprehensive security program); Assurance of Voluntary Compli-
ance, In re Health Net, No. 10-040 (Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Health Net AVC] (on file with author) (agreeing to train staff about mandatory
encryption, adopt a comprehensive security program, and engage in a security audit by a
third party); Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re TJX Cos., Inc., No. 09-083 (Office
of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y. May 28, 2009) [hereinafter TJX Cos. AVC], http://www.infolaw-
group.com/2009/07/articles/breach-notice/tjx-settles-with-state-attorneys-general-for-9-
75-million/ (settling with forty-one attorneys general to adopt a program that matches the
information security program required by the FTC’s consent decree); Press Release, Office
of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., TD Bank to Pay $625,000 to Address Data Breach Involving
Thousands of Massachusetts Residents (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-
and-updates/press-releases/2014/2014-12-08-td-bank.html (agreeing to implement written
security program, conduct annual security audit, encrypt data, and take reasonable steps to
ensure security procedures of data vendors).
227 Civil penalties have ranged from $70,000 to more than $9 million. See, e.g., Villareal,
No. 2010-CI-13625 ($70,000); TJX Cos. AVC, supra note 226 ($9.75 million).  Under sec-
tion 5, the FTC cannot seek civil penalties for unfair or deceptive data security practices.
Hartzog & Solove, Scope and Potential, supra note 2.
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Attorneys general have strengthened security protections for sensitive
data.228  Consider the recent investigation of Uber’s internal location track-
ing system.  Uber executives allegedly used the tracking system—called “God
View”—to access the location of journalists’ locations.229  On January 6,
2016, Uber agreed to adopt security measures that would protect the real-
time locations of riders.230  The agreement required Uber to encrypt rider
location data, adopt multi-factor authentication before employees could
access “especially sensitive rider personal information,” and limit access to
location data.231
Another aspect of data security strengthened by state attorneys general
relates to the assistance provided data-breach victims.  Attorneys general rou-
tinely ask companies to provide victims with a year of free credit monitoring
and identity-theft insurance.232  Connecticut Attorney General George Jep-
sen has argued that consumers should receive two years of identity-theft
insurance and credit monitoring in data breaches involving “highly sensitive
information” even though state law only requires one year of credit
monitoring.233
3. Bankruptcy
The FTC and state attorneys general have set important standards for
the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy proceedings.  Fifteen years ago, in
FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC,234 the FTC and forty-four state attorneys general
228 In 2011, Massachusetts broke new ground in litigation against a restaurant chain
that allegedly failed to protect credit card data even though it knew about a security
breach.  The settlement established that failing to adhere to the strict Payment Card Indus-
try Data Security Standards amounted to a deceptive trade practice.  Commonwealth v.
Briar Grp., LLC, Civ. No. 11-1185 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011) (order of final judgment
by consent).  Practitioners warned clients that the case would have “broad implications and
telegraph the posture of the Massachusetts Attorney General in future data breach cases”
and stands as a “harbinger of similar actions pursued in other jurisdictions on like
grounds.” Massachusetts Attorney General Breaking New Ground in Data Security Enforcement?,
EDWARDS ANGELL PALMER & DODGE (Apr. 2011), http://media.lockelord.com/files/
upload/2011-CA-MA-AG-DataSecurity.pdf.
229 Kim Bellware, Uber Settles Investigation into Creepy ‘God View’ Tracking Program, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2016, 8:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-settle-
ment-god-view_568da2a6e4b0c8beacf5a46a.
230 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Set-
tlement with Uber to Enhance Rider Privacy (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-uber-enhance-rider-privacy.
231 Id.
232 OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., INFORMATION EXPOSED: HISTORICAL EXAMINA-
TION OF DATA BREACHES IN NEW YORK STATE 14 (2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
data_breach_report071414.pdf.
233 Jenna N. Felz, Connecticut May Become First State to Require Identity Theft Protection,
BAKER HOSTETLER DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (June 15, 2015), http://www.datapriva-
cymonitor.com/data-breaches/connecticut-may-become-first-state-to-require-identity-theft-
protection/ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Attorney General Jepsen).
234 FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, Civ. No. 00-11341 (D. Mass. July 21, 2000).
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asked a bankruptcy court to stop a toy retailer from selling customers’ data
because the company had promised not to share the data with third parties
in its privacy policy.  Their argument was that the sale would amount to a
deceptive practice.235
Although the FTC offered to settle the case by allowing the sale to a
qualified buyer, the attorneys general continued to object on the grounds
that any sale would be unlawful without consumer consent.236  The settle-
ment was never approved, and consumers’ data was destroyed.237  Attorneys
general next lobbied Congress to require the appointment of a consumer
privacy ombudsman in bankruptcy proceedings.238  The amendment was
adopted in 2005.239
Since Toysmart, state attorneys general have challenged the sale of cus-
tomer data in other bankruptcies, securing stronger protections than sought
by the FTC.240  In the bankruptcy proceedings for RadioShack, the FTC
argued that the buyer should agree to be bound by RadioShack’s privacy
policy, which said that consumers’ data would not be sold, or, alternatively,
that RadioShack would obtain consumers’ affirmative consent before trans-
ferring their personal data.241  Thirty-eight attorneys general, however,
insisted upon stronger protections.  RadioShack settled with the states, agree-
ing to destroy most of the data, including Social Security numbers, telephone
numbers, and dates of birth, and to reduce the number of data points per
customer available for sale from 170 to 7.242
Attorneys general have secured protections for consumers’ data beyond
promises made in privacy policies.  With their enforcement leadership, sales
of highly sensitive personal data, such as sexual and dating preferences, have
been prevented.243  In cases where privacy policies were silent as to what
would happen to data in the event of bankruptcy, attorneys general have
convinced bankruptcy ombudsmen to ban the sale of sensitive data and to
give consumers a chance to opt out of the sale of the remaining data.244
235 States Active in Recent Mega Bankruptcies, NAAG GAZETTE (June 30, 2009), http://www
.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume-3-number-5/states-active-in-recent-mega-
bankruptcies.php.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 State AGs Demand Changes to Bankrupt RadioShack’s Use of Customer Data, HOGAN
LOVELLS CHRON. DATA PROT. (July 22, 2015), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2015/07/
articles/consumer-privacy/state-ags-demand-changes-to-bankrupt-radio-shacks-use-of-cus-
tomer-data/.
242 Id.
243 See, e.g., James R. Hood, True.com Sale Is Off; Failed Buyer Trashes Texas Attorney Gen-
eral, CONSUMER AFF. (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/truecom-
sale-is-off-failed-buyer-trashes-texas-attorney-general-102513.html.
244 See, e.g., States Active in Recent Mega Bankruptcies, supra note 235 (reporting that attor-
neys general secured protections for consumer data in Circuit City bankruptcy, including
banning sale of data that would trigger data-breach notification laws).
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4. Privacy Governance
In the past fifteen years, major businesses have hired chief privacy
officers to address privacy and data security concerns.245  Emulating the
approach of the FTC, state attorneys general have turned privacy’s presence
in the C-Suite from a voluntary practice into a legal requirement.246  In mul-
tistate and individual actions, state attorneys general have required compa-
nies to integrate privacy professionals into corporate boardrooms.
Consider the multistate investigation of Google for collecting data from
unsecured wireless networks nationwide through its Street View vehicles.  An
eight-state executive committee, led by Connecticut, investigated Google for
its collection of network identification information and “payload data” trans-
mitted over unsecured business and personal wireless networks between 2008
and March 2010.247  Google acknowledged the possibility that the collected
data included partial or complete email communications.
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia signed an AVC with
Google resolving consumer protection and privacy claims.248  As part of the
AVC, Google agreed to adopt a privacy program requiring notification of
senior management about the terms of the agreement, designation of an
employee to coordinate the privacy program, employee training about the
importance of user privacy, and development of policies and procedures for
responding to events involving the unauthorized collection, use, or disclo-
sure of user data.  Google agreed to provide privacy awareness training to
245 BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 3, at 251.
246 FTC consent decrees in consumer privacy cases typically require companies to estab-
lish comprehensive privacy programs that include the designation of an employee to coor-
dinate and be responsible for the privacy program. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In re
Google Inc, No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf.
247 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Attorney General Announces $7
Million Settlement with Google over Street View Collection of WiFi Data (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=520518.  In addition to Connecticut, the executive
committee included Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
Texas. Id.  NAAG’s chief counsel for cyber law, Hedda Litwin, advised the multistate
group. Id. Other states joining the multistate agreement included Alaska, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Id. Privacy advocacy group Electronic Privacy Infor-
mation Center urged the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of
Justice to investigate Google as well.  Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC (May 18, 2010), https://epic.org/pri-
vacy/cloudcomputing/google/EPIC_StreetView_FCC_Letter_05_21_10.pdf.  The FCC
fined Google for failing to comply with its investigation. In re Google, Inc., 27 FCC Rcd.
4012 (Apr. 13, 2012).
248 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Conn., Assurance of Voluntary Compli-
ance (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2013/20130312_goog
le_avc.pdf.
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counsel advising product teams.  The company paid a seven-million-dollar
fine to the states.
California has embraced this approach in recent cases.  In 2015, Califor-
nia sued Houzz, an online home remodeling retailer, for recording tele-
phone calls with consumers without informing them that they were being
recorded in violation of California’s wiretap and UDAP laws.249  In a stipu-
lated judgment, the company agreed to appoint an individual to serve as a
chief privacy officer to oversee compliance with privacy laws and report con-
cerns to company executives.250  Houzz agreed to conduct a privacy risk
assessment addressing its compliance with relevant privacy laws and that of its
business partners with whom it shares consumers’ personal data.251  Wells
Fargo similarly agreed to adopt a privacy program in its 2016 settlement with
the California Attorney General’s Office.252
As Kenneth Bamberger and Deidre Mulligan document in their impor-
tant work, the presence of privacy professionals in corporate boardrooms is
on the rise.253  Following the lead of the FTC, attorneys general have rein-
forced such self-regulation with law, for the good of consumers.
* * *
State attorneys general have shaped privacy and data security policy in
several ways.  They have established privacy norms in the absence of federal
leadership.  They have pressed for thicker consumer privacy protections than
those sought by federal agencies.  They have reinforced federal norms in
areas where federal agencies have had superior technical and policy exper-
tise.  The next Part assesses that work and makes suggestions for moving
forward.
III. MOVING FORWARD
As responses to FOIA requests and qualitative interviews demonstrate,
attorneys general have been privacy pioneers.  This Part turns from the past
and looks towards the future.  It highlights key features of AG offices that
have been crucial to privacy policymaking in the hopes that those features
can be replicated and improved.254  It assesses criticism of state privacy
249 People v. Houzz Inc., No. 115-cv-286406 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2015) (order grant-
ing permanent injunction), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/
2015%2010-02%20-%20Final%20Judgment%20and%20Permanent%20Injunction.pdf.
The FTC declined to investigate Google in the Street View matter.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 People v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. BC611105 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2016), https://
oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/Court%20approved%20Wells%20
Fargo%20Stip%20Judgment%203_28_16_0.pdf?.  Wells Fargo agreed to designate officers
to oversee the company’s compliance with its agreement not to record phone calls with
consumers without notifying them that they are being recorded. Id.
253 See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 3.
254 Several states have expressed interest in learning from the privacy-related work of
other offices. See, e.g., Wright Interview, supra note 114 (discussing his desire, as Chief of
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enforcement, including concerns that multiple enforcers risk over-deter-
rence and interest group capture.  It evaluates calls for federal preemption of
both AG enforcement power and state laws.  It explores the implications of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  This Part identifies weaknesses in
state enforcement activity and offers suggestions to enhance its efficiency,
efficacy, and transparency.  It ends with a turn to substance by urging state
enforcers to address troubling practices that deserve regulatory oversight.
A. Strengths
States’ chief law enforcers have responded quickly to consumer privacy
concerns.  This is partially because staff can pursue initiatives with little
bureaucratic wrangling.  After all, the buck stops with a single boss—the state
attorney general.  As Kathleen McGee, the Chief of New York’s Internet
Bureau, explains, “we do not have the politics of five commissioners so it is
easier for us to move forward on cases.”255
Also, unlike federal agencies, state attorneys general are directly
accountable to voters, many of whom voice concerns about privacy and data
security.  Idaho AG Lawrence Wasden echoed others in noting that because
privacy and data security are at the top of his constituents’ list, they are at the
top of his.256  This Section explores the deeper structural reasons for such
swift and nimble privacy policymaking.
1. Specialization
Offices of attorneys general—particularly career staff—have developed
specialties that grow out of a familiarity with local conditions.  They “are the
first to see and understand the cons and conmen working their way through
the system, receiving and fielding consumer complaints about every-
thing . . . . [They] often see problems consumers are facing before [the FTC
does] in Washington.”257  In turn, staff focus on the privacy and data security
problems in their states.
Consider the specialization of the privacy leaders’ offices.  Since the
birth of Silicon Valley, California’s attorneys general have been finely attuned
the Consumer Protection Bureau, to expand the Delaware AG Office’s privacy-related
work); Kron Interview, supra note 52 (same).  Joanne McNabb, California’s privacy educa-
tor, has spoken to other AG offices for this reason.  McNabb Interview Mar. 3, supra note
43.
255 McGee Interview, supra note 45.
256 Divonne Smoyer & Frederick Lah, Idaho AG Talks Breach Notification, His Role as Pri-
vacy Enforcer, IAPP (Oct. 28, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/idaho-ag-talks-about-breach-
notification-his-role-as-privacy-enforcer/; see also, e.g., Lemos, supra note 94, at 722–23
(explaining that attorneys general have incentive to respond to interests of constituents,
which is amplified by their ambitions for higher office).
257 Comm’r Julie Brill, Keynote Address to the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen.: Federal and
State Law Enforcement Cooperation: A Lesson from Baseball (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/federal-and-state-law-enforce-
ment-cooperation-lesson-baseball/120305naagspeech.pdf.
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to privacy and data security issues in the technology sector.258  Health privacy
and data security are focal points for Massachusetts259 and Connecticut,260
an outgrowth of the high concentration of hospitals and insurance compa-
258 This theme was clear from responses to FOIA requests, research, and interviews of
AG Kamala Harris, see Harris Interview, supra note 13, and current and former staff, see,
e.g., Henrichsen Interview, supra note 8; LeBlanc Interview, supra note 124; McNabb Inter-
view Mar. 3, supra note 43.
259 The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office has pursued enforcement actions
against health providers for failing to maintain basic security practices and unreasonably
delaying data-breach notification. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass.,
Boston Children’s Hospital Settles Data Breach Allegations (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www
.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2014/2014-12-19-boston-childrens.html;
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center to
Pay $100,000 Over Data Breach Allegations (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.mass.gov/ago/
news-and-updates/press-releases/2014/2014-11-21-beth-israel-data-breach.html; Press
Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., Women & Infants Hospital to Pay $150,000 to
Settle Data Breach Allegations Involving Massachusetts Patients (July 23, 2014), http://
www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2014/2014-07-23-women-infants-hos-
pital.html; Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., Former Owners of Medical
Billing Practice, Pathology Groups Agree to Pay $140,000 to Settle Claims That Patients’
Health Information Was Disposed of at Georgetown Dump (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www
.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2013/140k-settlement-over-medical-info-
disposed-of-at-dump.html; Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., South Shore
Hospital to Pay $750,000 to Settle Data Breach Allegations (May 24, 2012), http://www
.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-05-24-south-shore-hospital-
data-breach-settlement.html.  The Massachusetts AG’s Office has also provided training in
data privacy protection to physicians.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., Phy-
sicians Receive Training and Education in Data Privacy Protection (Oct. 25, 2012), http://
www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-25-physicians-training
.html.
260 See, e.g., Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Hartford Hosp. (State of Conn.,
Dept. of Consumer Prot. Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/
2015/20151105_hartford_hospital_privacyavc.pdf; Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In
re Yale Univ.(State of Conn., Dept. of Consumer Prot. May 11, 2015) (on file with author);
Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Metro. Life Ins. Co. (State of Conn., Dept. of
Consumer Prot. Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2012/1-24-
12_metropolitan_life_insurance_co.pdf; Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Griffin
Hosp. (State of Conn., Dept. of Consumer Prot. Mar. 15, 2011) (on file with author);
Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Express Scripts, Inc. (State of Conn., Dept. of
Consumer Prot. Oct. 11, 2010) (on file with author).  The AG’s Office has advised local
hospitals on HIPAA and HITECH compliance. See 2011–2012 CONN. ATT’Y GEN. ANN.
REP., http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/about_us/annualreport2011-12.pdf.
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nies within their borders.261  The New York attorney general’s office has long
focused on privacy issues involving the financial sector.262
Concerns of citizens heavily influence an attorney general’s agenda.263
As former Illinois Assistant AG Erik Jones explained, “[A]ttorneys general
hear directly from the residents they serve on a daily basis.”264  For that rea-
son, identity theft and data security have been a priority for Illinois AG Lisa
Madigan.265  Her office has heard from thousands of residents whose identi-
ties were stolen in the wake of data breaches.266  Her constituents’ struggles
were behind her recent efforts to update the state’s data-breach notification
law.267  For the same reason, combating illegal telemarketing is a priority for
Indiana268 and North Carolina.269
261 Also influential is the fact that Massachusetts has the most comprehensive state data
security regulations in the country. See Standards for the Protection of Personal Informa-
tion of Residents of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17 (2010);
see also Letter from Maura Healey, Mass. Att’y Gen., to Reps. Michael C. Burgess & Jan
Schakowsky (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2015/ago-ltr-re-
dsbna-of-2015.pdf.
262 See Lipka, supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s settlement
with banks to restrict the use of bank-history database); Press Release, Office of the Att’y
Gen. of N.Y., AG Schneiderman Announces Groundbreaking Consumer Protection Settle-
ment, supra note 213; see also, Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., Spitzer
Secures Privacy Agreement with National Bank (Jan. 25, 2000), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
press-release/spitzer-secures-privacy-agreement-national-bank.
263 Lemos, supra note 94, at 747.
264 Jones, supra note 134.  Jones is now a partner at Venable with a practice focusing on
data privacy and state attorney general activity. Erik Jones, VENABLE LLP, https://www.ven-
able.com/erik-jones/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).  As Jones noted in our session on state
AG privacy policymaking at the 2016 Privacy and Security Forum, inadequate data security
was a crucial issue for AG Madigan because countless constituents struggled with the eco-
nomic and emotional fallout of data breaches.
265 See Jones, supra note 134.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 The most common complaint made to the Indiana AG’s Office is unwanted tele-
phone calls. See AG Zoeller, Missouri AG’s Office Host 3rd Annual No Call Summit Focused on
New Efforts to Stop Unwanted Calls, CITY COUNTY OBSERVER (Apr. 23, 2016), http://city-
countyobserver.com/ag-zoeller-missouri-ags-office-host-3rd-annual-no-call-summit-focused-
on-new-efforts-to-stop-unwanted-calls/.  In 2015, the Office received 14,000 complaints
about unwanted calls, the majority of which were about robocalls. See AG Zoeller Urges Con-
gress to Pass HANGUP Act, Ban All Robocalls to Cell Phones, IN.GOV (Feb. 10, 2016), http://
www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=242410&informa
tion_id=237505&type=&syndicate=syndicate.  AG Greg Zoeller helped strengthen the
state’s telephone privacy laws, banning nearly all types of robocalls. See supra note 200.
Indiana has joined forces with Missouri to hold annual Do Not Call conferences to educate
AG offices about consumers’ rights and potential penalties.  See Do Not Call: The History of
Do Not Call and How Telemarketing Has Evolved, 1 NAGTRI J. 4 (2016), http://www.naag
.org/publications/nagtri-journal/volume-1-number-4/do-not-call-the-history-of-do-not-call-
and-how-telemarketing-has-evolved.php.
269 See, e.g., Complaint, FTC v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., Civ. No. 15-CV-60423 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 3, 2015); State v. ISI Alarms NC, Inc., 13 CV 014147 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 2015)
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Staff expertise extends beyond local concerns.  The Texas Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office has been at the forefront of privacy protections in bankruptcy
sales since 2000.270  Through changing administrations, career staff have
secured protections for consumer data in various bankruptcy proceedings,
including Living.com,271 DrKoop.com,272 True.com,273 and RadioShack.274
The Vermont Attorney General’s Office has shown an avid interest in
data security.275  Like other states, the Vermont data-breach notification law
requires businesses to notify the office within fourteen days of discovering a
(order granting permanent injunction) (noting parties’ agreement that defendant would
abide by Do Not Call Registry and other telemarketing legal requirements and to pay the
state $1 million); State v. Auto. Prot., LLC (N.C. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 2011) (order granting
permanent injunction) (ordering the defendant to stop violating North Carolina’s Tele-
phone Solicitations Act and UDAP law); State v. Darain Atkinson et al., 10 Civ. 007470
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2010) (order granting permanent injunction) (describing defen-
dant’s settling of claims with North Carolina and ten other states related to violations of Do
Not Call laws); Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Rosetta Stone Comm. (Office of
the Att’y Gen. of N.C. Apr. 14, 2011) (on file with author) (agreeing to comply with state
and federal telemarketing laws related to autodialed and pre-recorded calls, to implement
written procedures for employees to ensure compliance with the law, and to pay $10,000 in
civil penalties to state); Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Pub. Policy Polling, LLC
(Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.C. Sept. 3, 2010) (on file with author); Assurance of Volun-
tary Compliance, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C. (Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.C. Jan.
27, 2010) (on file with author) (agreeing not to contact North Carolina residents with pre-
recorded messages in violation of North Carolina law and to pay $95,000 in civil penalties
to the state).
270 Todd R. Weiss, Texas Attorney General Sues to Stop Living.com Data Sale, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Oct. 2, 2000), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2588972/data-pri-
vacy/texas-attorney-general-sues-to-stop-living-com-data-sale.html (explaining that after
Texas sued the online retailer to prevent the sale of customer data in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the company agreed to destroy consumers’ financial data and to sell customer list
only if consumers had a chance to remove their names).
271 Id.
272 Texas AG Reaches Privacy Settlement with Dr. Koop, AUSTIN BUS. J. (Mar. 20, 2002),
http://www.bizjournals.com/austin/stories/2002/03/18/daily24.html (noting that the
Texas AG reached an agreement with the trustee administering the bankruptcy liquidation
of the company providing access to medical databases and publications).
273 Bryan Cohen, Texas AG Settles with Bankrupt Online Dating Service, LEGAL NEWSLINE
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510516699-texas-ag-settles-with-bank-
rupt-online-dating-service.
274 Texas was the first of thirty-eight state attorneys general to object to RadioShack’s
proposed sale.  Melanie Cohen, The Daily Docket: Texas AG Cites Privacy Concerns in Radi-
oShack Customer Data Sale, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2015, 10:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/bankruptcy/2015/04/17/the-daily-docket-texas-ag-cites-privacy-concerns-in-radio
shack-customer-data-sale/; see also Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Tex., Attorney
General Paxton Objects to Sale of Texans’ Personal Data in RadioShack Bankruptcy Case
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=5000.
275 Kriger Interview, supra note 38.
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breach.276  This has allowed the office to intervene on behalf of Vermont
citizens—with the chance of improving data security beyond its borders.277
2. Multistate Cooperation
Another strength is the ability of state enforcers to collaborate with each
other.278  Members of the NAAG Privacy Working Group hold monthly tele-
phone calls to discuss best practices and emerging risks.279  They coordinate
responses to data breaches impacting citizens across the country.280
Interviews with attorneys general and career staff have highlighted the
importance of multistate efforts to share expertise and conserve resources.281
The Texas Attorney General’s Office, for instance, often takes the lead in
bankruptcy proceedings,282 while Connecticut and Illinois frequently spear-
head data security cases.283  Members of the NAAG Privacy Working Group
also take turns leading multistate investigations.284  Small states join multis-
tate efforts in cases where they would have lacked the resources and expertise
to proceed alone.285  Crucially, multistate investigations grow in strength as
more states participate.  The Chief of the Illinois Consumer Protection
Bureau, Deborah Hagan, explained that attorneys general enjoy more lever-
276 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (West 2016).
277 Kriger Interview, supra note 38.  Vermont Assistant AG Ryan Kriger explained that a
small state like Vermont can impact data security practices across the country when it inves-
tigates data breaches impacting citizens nationwide. Id.  To take just one month—July
2014—the Vermont AG’s Office communicated with thirty-one companies, mostly with
national operations, to press for remedial actions in the wake of data breaches.  FOIA
Response Letter (Vermont) (on file with author).
278 See, e.g., Brief for Attorneys General as Amici Curiae Supporting General Hood’s
Motion to Dismiss, Google, Inc. v. Jim Hood, No. 3:14-CV-981, 2015 WL 1029600 (S.D.
Miss. Feb. 15, 2015) (supporting Mississippi’s request for discovery in its investigation of
Google).
279 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
280 Id.
281 Fitzsimmons Interview, supra note 5; Hagan & Van Hise Interview, supra note 5;
Jepsen Interview, supra note 49; McNabb Interview July 20, supra note 59.
282 See supra notes 270–74 (discussing bankruptcy cases led by Texas).
283 Connecticut and Illinois are leading investigations into data breaches of eBay (with
Florida’s assistance), see Ryan Mac, California Joins Other States in Investigation of eBay Hack,
FORBES (May 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/05/23/as-ebay-noti-
fies-users-of-hack-states-launch-investigation/#3af21dd4bd6a, Neiman Marcus, see Chris
Dolmetsch & Andrew Harris, Connecticut Attorney General Probing Neiman Marcus Breach,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-13/
connecticut-attorney-general-probing-neiman-marcus-breach, and Home Depot (with Cali-
fornia’s assistance), see, e.g., Jonathan Randles, States Investigate Home Depot Breach, LAW360
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/575613/states-investigate-home-depot-
data-breach.
284 See id.
285 Conti Interview, supra note 53 (discussing Maine’s involvement in various multistate
investigations).
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age proceeding together than if they pursue cases individually.286 Particularly
in data-breach matters, multistate efforts garner considerable support, likely
because constituents express considerable concern about identity theft.
To be sure, in any given multistate investigation, there are usually a
handful of states that decline to participate.  Why would states remain on the
sidelines?  One possibility is that their offices are preoccupied with other
issues; another is the potential influence of lobbyists.  Nonetheless, what can
be said is that cooperation has been the overwhelming trend when it comes
to consumer privacy and data security matters.
Of course, productive relationships among state attorneys general are
not inevitable.  AG offices could interfere with multistate cooperation.  For
instance, an attorney general could offer a weak settlement to a company,
undermining the negotiating position of a multistate group interested in
establishing thicker protections for consumers.287  Staff could break away
from a multistate effort to earn political points for the boss.288  These scena-
rios are possible, but the experience of the NAAG Privacy Working Group
shows that cooperation happens more frequently than not.  Productive rela-
tionships amongst career staff and limited state budgets weigh in favor of
collaboration.289
Then too, multistate agreements can harmonize norms across jurisdic-
tions, especially as more and more states participate.  They set privacy policy
for a company’s activities in the signature states.290  Crucially, multistate set-
tlements have stabilized and entrenched norms set by the FTC,291 especially
in the area of data security.292
3. Federal Agencies: Synergies and Dialogue
Attorneys general have enjoyed a synergistic relationship with federal
agencies working on privacy and data security issues.  This has been true
since the earliest days of AG engagement with consumer protection issues.
In the 1970s, the FTC was crucial to the passage of state UDAP laws, which
gave enforcement power to attorneys general.293
286 Hagan & Van Hise Interview, supra note 5.
287 Former Maryland Assistant AG Steven Ruckman helped me think through these
possible scenarios.
288 Some limelight-seeking is inevitable and potentially productive. See Lemos, supra
note 94, at 742 (explaining that because attorneys general are elected, they have “incentive
to make a name for themselves”).  An attorney general might break away from others’
efforts to press for greater protections for constituents.
289 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
290 See supra note 247 (discussing how precedent set in Google matters went further
than the FTC consent decree in protecting consumers’ privacy choices).
291 See supra notes 226–27 (discussing multistate AVC in the TJX data-breach case).
292 See, e.g., TJX Cos. AVC, supra note 226; Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re
Choicepoint (Or. Dep’t of Justice May 30, 2007) (on file with author).
293 See Cole, supra note 29, at 126.  The FTC promoted state UDAP laws because state
attorneys general lacked authority to enforce section 5 and the FTC needed help protect-
ing consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. Id.
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The FTC has remained a strong supporter of state privacy enforcers.
Then-FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, who stepped down from her post near
the end of her term, has emphasized the crucial role played by attorneys
general in privacy regulation.294  At a NAAG meeting, she noted that the
FTC has “relied on our partners in the states to help us carry out our mission
to protect consumers as they navigate the marketplace . . . in today’s fast-
paced, technologically advanced world, we depend on you more than
ever.”295
Federal agencies and state attorneys general have joined forces in efforts
to nudge compliance.296  For instance, New York AG Eric Schneiderman and
the FCC criticized PayPal’s proposal to condition service on consumers’
receipt of robocalls.297  As AG Schneiderman and the FCC noted in public
statements, PayPal’s proposed policy would violate the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.298  In social media, consumers expressed their disapproval of
PayPal’s plan.299  PayPal soon reversed course, agreeing to make robocalls
only to consumers who explicitly opted in to receiving them.300  FCC’s Chief
of Enforcement Travis LeBlanc explained that PayPal—like other companies
faced with bad publicity—went further than what the law required to contain
the damage to its reputation.301
294 Divonne Smoyer & Christine Nielsen Czuprynski, FTC Commissioner Brill Urges State
AGs to Up the Ante, REEDSMITH TECH. L. DISPATCH (July 25, 2014), http://www.technology-
lawdispatch.com/2014/07/privacy-data-protection/ftc-commissioner-brill-urges-state-ags-
to-up-the-ante/.  Before serving as FTC commissioner, Brill served as an assistant AG in two
state attorney general offices, Vermont and North Carolina. Id.
295 Brill, supra note 257.
296 The relationship between attorneys general and federal agencies reflects a “poly-
phonic federalism” that Robert Schapiro envisions in his work. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
(2009) (exploring state and federal relations as promoting plurality, diversity, and produc-
tive dialogue in a dynamic, bottom-up way).
297 Dani Kass, FCC, NY AG Question PayPal, EBay Autodialing Policies, LAW360 (June 11,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/666650/fcc-ny-ag-question-paypal-ebay-autodial-
ing-policies.
298 Jennifer Abel, New York Attorney General Questions PayPal and eBay Robocall Mandates,
CONSUMER AFF. (June 11, 2015), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/new-york-attor-
ney-general-questions-paypal-and-ebay-robocall-mandates-061115.html.
299 See Zach Miners, PayPal Users May Get Break on Unsolicited Robocalls, Texts, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Jun. 8, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2932320/data-pri-
vacy/paypal-users-may-get-break-on-unsolicited-robocalls-texts.html; see also Twitter, https:/
/twitter.com/search?q=%23paypal%20%23robocalls&src=typd (Oct. 18, 2016) (a search
of tweets containing #paypal and #robocalls).
300 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of N.Y., Statement by AG Schneiderman on
Paypal’s Robocalling Commitments (June 29, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/
statement-ag-schneiderman-paypal%E2%80%99s-robocalling-commitments.
301 LeBlanc Interview, supra note 124.  Before taking over as Chief of Enforcement for
the FCC, LeBlanc served as the top deputy and senior adviser to AG Harris and ran Califor-
nia’s first high-tech crime and data privacy unit.  Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman
Wheeler Announces Appointment of Acting Chief, Enf’t Bureau (Mar. 4, 2014), https://
www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-wheeler-appointment-acting-chief-enforcement-bureau.
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An important illustration of the synergistic relationship between the
FTC and attorneys general involves Google.  In 2011, the FTC entered into a
consent order with Google requiring it to obtain outside audits of its privacy
practices for the next twenty years.302  Attorneys general reinforced the
FTC’s efforts.303  In a letter sent by NAAG in 2012, thirty-nine attorneys gen-
eral criticized Google’s unified privacy policy, which allowed the company to
share consumers’ personal data across its services.304  As the group of state
attorneys general argued, consumers did not have a real choice to “exit the
Google products ecosystem.”305  The group pressed Google to give consum-
ers the ability to review and delete data collected about them from different
Google services.306  The attorneys general urged the company to be more
transparent about the types of personal data collected by each service.
In 2013, Google agreed to changes related to the transparency of its data
practices.  Consumers were notified of ways that they could keep information
associated with one service separate from information associated with
another; consumers were given the ability to see how some data was collected
and shared across services.  FTC Commissioner Brill noted: “That 39 AGs
recently called on Google to explain its new privacy policies shows we are not
only on the same team—we are on the same page of a winning playbook.”307
The relationship between federal agencies has also generated productive
dissent, the sort of “uncooperative federalism” explored by constitutional law
scholars Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken.308  The case involving
Google’s failure to respect consumers’ do-not-track settings exemplifies the
point.309  There, state attorneys general pressed for thicker consumer privacy
protections, forsaking the thinner protections in the FTC’s consent
decree.310
The precedent set in multistate agreements—such as the Google and
PointRoll matters—could prod a change in the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence,
302 Decision and Order, In re Google, Inc., No. C-4336, (Oct. 13, 2011); Press Release,
FTC, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout (Oct. 24,
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/buzz.shtm.
303 Brill, supra note 257.
304 Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Larry Page, CEO of Google (Feb. 22, 2012),
https://epic.org/privacy/google/20120222-Google-Privacy-Policy-Final.pdf.
305 Id.
306 Letter from Twenty-three Att’ys Gen. to Larry Page, Chief Exec. Officer, Google,
Inc., (July 3, 2013), https://epic.org/privacy/google/20120222-Google-Privacy-Policy-Final
.pdf.
307 Brill, supra note 257.
308 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1271 (2009).
309 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 148–54.  The Google Street View investigation fits in the same mold.
Although privacy advocacy group EPIC urged the Department of Justice and the FCC to
investigate Google’s collection of consumers’ unencrypted Wi-Fi payload data in 2010, only
the states, with the leadership of Connecticut, pursued the matter vigorously, ending with
an AVC with thirty-eight states. See supra note 154; see also Comments of Marc Rotenberg,
Bright Ideas Discussion at EPIC, July 15, 2016 (on file with author).
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much in the way that Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have called on the
FTC to press for thicker norms.311  The FTC is more likely to embrace evolv-
ing norms if they reflect existing best practices.  The precedent set by state
attorneys general could help nudge best practices towards greater consumer
protections that the FTC might endorse in its privacy jurisprudence.  Because
attorneys general serve as “connected critics” to the FTC, they may have a
powerful bid for the FTC’s attention.312  In short, attorneys general serve as
crucial partners, dissenters, and enforcement gap fillers vis-a`-vis federal
agencies.
4. EU Harmonization
Might industry look favorably on AG enforcement activity because, in
certain respects, it comports with EU requirements, especially if companies
collect data from European citizens?  In 2016, the Department of Commerce
and European regulators struck a deal that will allow U.S. companies to han-
dle European citizens’ personal data if they agree to follow certain data pro-
tection principles.313  Depending on the circumstances, U.S. companies may
be expected to comply with the EU General Data Protection Regulation
311 Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2.
312 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 308, at 1288 (discussing the role of the
connected critic in the uncooperative federalism model).
313 Under the European Commission’s Directive on Data Protection of 1998, EU Mem-
ber States cannot transfer personal data to countries that lack an “‘adequa[te]’ standard
for privacy protection.” U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV (Dec. 18, 2013), https://
build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.  Under the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor
agreement, U.S. companies could handle the personal data of the citizens of EU Member
States if they agreed to follow seven data-practice principles. Id.  In 2015, a European
Court of Justice decision, Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 362/
14, invalidated the EU Safe Harbor agreement based on the U.S. surveillance practices
exposed by Edward Snowden.  On February 2, 2016, European authorities and U.S. offi-
cials struck an agreement that renegotiated the Safe Harbor deal, allowing businesses to
continue moving people’s digital information across the Atlantic. See Mark Scott, U.S. and
Europe in ‘Safe Harbor’ Data Deal, but Legal Fight May Await, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/us-europe-safe-harbor-data-deal.html?_r=0.
The deal was officially approved by the EU’s Member States. See Hogan Lovells, Privacy
Shield Receives Final Approval from European Commission—Some Initial Practical Advice, CHRON.
DATA PROT. (July 12, 2016), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2016/07/articles/interna
tional-eu-privacy/privacy-shield-receives-final-approval-from-european-commission-some-
initial-practical-advice-for-clients/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_cam
paign=Feed%3A+ChronicleOfDataProtection+%28HL+Chronicle+of+Data+Protection%
29; see also Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Statement by Vice-President Ansip and Commis-
sioner Jourova´ on the Occasion of the Adoption by Member States of the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield (July 8, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2443_en
.htm.  As Omer Tene, Vice President of Research and Education at the International Asso-
ciation of Privacy Professionals, explains, there are lingering concerns that the Privacy
Shield may not satisfy the additional requirements and burdens of the GDPR.  Bradley
Barth, Survey: 34% of Privacy Pros Expect Their Companies to Certify Under Privacy Shield, SC
MAG. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.scmagazine.com/survey-34-of-privacy-pros-expect-their-
companies-to-certify-under-privacy-shield/article/519777/.
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(GDPR).314  Paul Schwartz has discussed efforts to harmonize EU-U.S. pri-
vacy policymaking in the shadow of a looming collision with EU data
regulations.315
Adhering to AG privacy policymaking would enable compliance with the
European approach in certain respects.316  Data-breach notification norms
are similar to the GDPR’s requirement that data controllers notify individuals
about data breaches without “undue delay” in certain circumstances.317
State AG enforcement has provided special protection for sensitive informa-
tion, which resonates with provisions of the GDPR.318  California urges com-
panies to explain their privacy policies in a clear and understandable
manner, much as in the EU.319  Compliance with AG privacy norms cannot
avoid all of the collisions that Paul Schwartz insightfully explores, but to the
extent that they do, there is an upside to following them.  Adhering to the
norms set by AG enforcement actions can facilitate compliance with certain
EU regulations.320
314 EU Member States accord omnibus protections to the handling of all personal data.
See Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism, supra note 1.  Each EU Member State has its
own data protection commission. Id.  By contrast, privacy regulation in the United States
does not come from a single source or regulator but rather from a combination of federal
and state legislation, federal agencies, and state attorneys general. Id.
315 See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Proce-
dures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013).
316 Thanks to Tanya Forsheit, Jules Polonetsky, Peter Swire, and Chris Wolf, who
emphasized this point with me.  As Tanya Forsheit noted, with the passage of California’s
Electronic Communications Privacy Law and the work of AG Harris, California could be
understood as compliant with EU data protection laws, if such a possibility could exist.
Telephone Interview with Tanya Forsheit, Partner, Frankfurt, Kurnit, Klein & Selz (Dec. 9,
2015).
317 The data-breach notification provisions of the GDPR were inspired by federal and
state data-breach notification laws.  In a plenary session, the European Parliament
approved the GDPR. See Data Protection Reform—Parliament Approves New Rules Fit for the
Digital Era, EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/
en/news-room/20160407IPR21776/Data-protection-reform-Parliament-approves-new-
rules-fit-for-the-digital-era.
318 See supra notes 185–87, 218, 230 (discussing, respectively, California’s approach to
the nonconsensual posting of nude images, Texas’s various informal agreements banning
the collection of children’s location data due to its sensitive nature, and New York’s infor-
mal agreement to protect highly sensitive location data).
319 Say What You Do and Do What You Say: Guidance for Privacy Policies, and for Life,
INFORMATIONLAWGROUP (May 26, 2014), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2014/05/arti-
cles/privacy-law/guidelines-for-your-privacy-policies-and-your-life-say-what-you-do-and-do-
what-you-say/. California’s best practices urge companies to inform consumers about what
types of data are collected, with whom data is shared, how long data is retained, and how
data can be corrected in a clear and easily understandable way, akin to the approach of the
GDPR. Id.
320 I am grateful to Margot Kaminski for urging me to frame the issue in this way.
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B. Objections and Proposals
AG privacy enforcement has been subject to criticism.  Some object to
having more than fifty state enforcers on the beat and to the diverse array of
state laws applied by them.  This Section addresses concerns about the poten-
tial pile-up of enforcement activity and calls for federal preemption.  It dis-
cusses the possibility of interest group capture and the implications of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  It turns to weaknesses in the tactics
and strategies employed by state attorneys general, and it offers solutions.
This Part ends by exploring new directions for AG privacy policymaking.
1. Threshold Concerns
A common objection to AG privacy enforcement is that “having fifty-plus
attorneys general and federal agencies on the beat leads to over-enforcement
and overwhelms companies.”321  Federal administrative law has something to
teach us in this respect.  In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, the Supreme
Court held that the cost of an investigation by one agency is “part of the
social burden of living under government.”322  But does that presumption
change if a company faces investigations by fifty or more regulators?  Is there
something legally significant about the potential pile-up effect?  Should Con-
gress preempt state enforcement?  Should it preempt state data security and
privacy laws in favor of a uniform federal standard?  Instead of over-deter-
rence, is the risk one of too little enforcement due to capture by corporate
interests?
a. Pile-Up Effect
The specter of fifty state attorneys general pursuing a company for pri-
vacy or data security violations is more theoretical than real.  As Massachu-
setts Assistant AG Sara Cable remarked, “The idea that all 50 attorneys
general will jump on a company separately is an illusion.”323  Of course, state
attorneys general could bring separate actions against companies, but they
hardly ever do so in practice.  Entities do not face fifty or more separate
investigations and enforcement actions, let alone more than one.
That trend will likely continue.  Because states have limited resources,
AG offices look for partners to share the burdens of litigation.324  Similarly,
321 Kriger Interview, supra note 38.
322 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (quoting Petroleum Expl., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 304
U.S. 209, 222 (1938)).
323 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
324 States have lined up on different sides in amicus briefs to courts.  This was true in
the Spokeo v. Robins case, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), which addressed whether plaintiffs had
Article III standing to sue a people-search website under the federal Fair Credit Reporting
Act for failing to maintain procedures to ensure the accuracy of personal data collected
and shared with employers.  In an amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf
of twelve other states and the District of Columbia, Massachusetts argued that false infor-
mation in a data profile can be expected to cause negative consequences for consumers,
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businesses favor multistate litigation because it is cheaper and easier to nego-
tiate with an office (or group of offices) representing several states.  States
and companies have strong incentive to prefer multistate proceedings rather
than separate actions.
Overlapping state investigations—though rare—have been productive.
Recall that three major credit-reporting agencies faced an investigation by
New York and a separate multistate investigation, which resulted in agree-
ments with similar terms.  Although there were duplicate costs, the pile-up
was productive.  As Chris Hoofnagle explained, the major credit-reporting
agencies had brazenly ignored the mandates of FCRA for years and federal
agencies did nothing about it.325  Under-enforcement was the norm for
decades.  The concurrent investigations put important pressure on credit-
reporting agencies to clean up their acts.326
What about duplicative state and federal actions?  Again, though rare,
when entities have faced separate federal and state investigations, productive
dialogue has been the result.  Recall that the FTC and the multistate group
investigated Google for deploying code that changed consumers’ no-track
settings.327  There, overlapping federal-state jurisdiction and separate
enforcement actions led to valuable dissent, rather than the same result for
double the price.
Of course, if the pile-up effect becomes a reality, entities could urge state
legislators to cut the budget of attorneys general or to limit the scope of their
authority.328  As Margaret Lemos explains, business interests are capable of
being heard by state legislatures and shutting down state AG enforcement.329
Industry could lobby Congress to limit the role of state attorneys general in
privacy and data security enforcement.
Now to the normative question of whether Congress should shut attor-
neys general out of the enforcement calculus.
including lost jobs.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., AG Healey Files
Supreme Court Brief Promoting Integrity and Fair Use of Personal Data (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2015/2015-09-09-spokeo-ami-
cus.html.  On behalf of seven other states, Alabama argued against standing on the
grounds that class actions threaten the viability of businesses and that narrow, technical
violations of FCRA should not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.  Brief for Alabama et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No.
13-339).  The disagreement in Spokeo grew out of concerns about class action litigation
rather than the merits of consumer privacy policy.
325 Memorandum from Chris Hoofnagle, Adjunct Professor of Law, Berkeley Sch. of
Law (Jan. 15, 2015) (on file with author).
326 Id.  There have been pile-ups of state attorneys general, notably in the tobacco liti-
gation. See MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN
TOBACCO POLITICS (3d ed. 2012).
327 See supra note 144.
328 Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Par-
ticipation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 613 (2006).
329 Lemos, supra note 94, at 748.
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b. Preempting State Enforcers
Should Congress curtail or eliminate the enforcement role of state attor-
neys general in privacy and data security matters on the grounds that their
participation risks undue complexity, high costs, and over-deterrence?  Fed-
eral laws could limit or remove AG offices’ ability to enforce privacy and
security consumer protections.
In considering such proposals, Congress should proceed carefully.330
State enforcers are essential to the efficient deterrence of privacy and data
security violations given the increasing marginalization of private law and the
practical constraints on federal agencies.  Typically, public enforcement and
private law claims operate together to discipline the market.331  But this is
not so for data harms, by which I mean setbacks to consumers’ legally pro-
tected interests due to inadequate data security or other privacy violations.332
Why not?
Although the most logical place for plaintiffs to begin is with the privacy
torts, they provide little relief for contemporary privacy and security
problems.  Overly narrow interpretations of the privacy torts—intrusion on
seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and misappropriation
of image—have prevented their ability to redress data harms.333  Similarly,
negligence, contract, and private UDAP claims are routinely dismissed due to
a lack of an “injury in fact” sufficient to support a finding of standing or
cognizable harms, or due to the economic loss rule.334  For most courts, pri-
vacy and data security harms are too speculative and hypothetical, too based
330 Proposed federal data-breach notification laws have pressed the point.  Some would
eliminate state enforcement; others would curtail the role of attorneys general in the
enforcement of a federal data-breach notification law. See, e.g., Data Security and Breach
Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015).  Under the Data Security and Breach
Notification Act of 2015, state attorneys general could bring enforcement actions for data
security failures only if the FTC has declined to do so. Id.  Massachusetts AG Maura Healey
opposes the bill because it “inject[s] unnecessary delay and costs, and unnecessarily com-
plicat[es] their efforts to enforce their respective consumer protection laws.”  Letter from
Maura Healey, Mass. Att’y Gen., to Michael C. Burgess, Chairman of H. Subcomm. on
Com., Mfg. & Trade, & Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member of H. Subcomm. on Com., Mfg.
& Trade (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2015/ago-ltr-re-dsbna-of-
2015.pdf.
331 David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION CHOICE,
supra note 23, at 54, 56 (explaining that tort law helps fill regulatory gaps by forcing the
disclosure of information, deterring excessive risk taking, and securing redress for
injuries).
332 See Catharine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Data Harms:
Rethinking Privacy and Data Security Injuries (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
333 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1826–28
(2010) [hereinafter Citron, Mainstreaming].
334 See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).  A minority of courts have upheld class actions in data-breach
cases, including the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819
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on subjective fears and anxieties, and not concrete and significant enough to
warrant recognition.335
Given that private litigation is not an avenue for efficient deterrence, the
more salient risk of curtailing or, more drastically, eliminating state AG
enforcement is under-deterrence.336  Federal authorities cannot attend to
most privacy and security problems because their resources are limited and
their duties ever expanding.337  Simply put, federal agencies have too few
resources and too many responsibilities.
If enforcement were solely in the hands of federal agencies, local mat-
ters would surely be overlooked.  This is especially true for data security mat-
ters.  Vermont’s Assistant AG Ryan Kriger explained, “Attorneys general fill
an important niche by serving as the local cop on the beat.  They investigate
local actors whose poor data practices impact citizens of our state.”338  The
FTC has brought a little over fifty data security cases in the past ten years due
to limited resources.339  State enforcers have been filling enforcement gaps.
Attorneys general were given the authority to pursue HIPAA violations pre-
cisely because Congress recognized that the Department of Health and
Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights could not do it all.  State attorneys
general complement the efforts of federal agencies, and, as we have seen,
they strengthen existing protections.340
The FTC has been applauded for its norm-setting and norm-guiding
efforts, and rightly so.341  Since 1997, the FTC has held workshops, issued
guidance documents, and met with stakeholders.342  The FTC’s settlements
have established a jurisprudence of privacy.343  But what will happen in the
F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2015).
335 See, e.g., In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 4759588
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013); Hammer v. Sam’s E., Inc., No. 12-cv-2618, 2013 WL 3756573 (D.
Kan. July 16, 2013).
336 Municipalities may have power to enforce UDAP laws, and some do engage in pri-
vacy policymaking.  The costs of coordination, however, would be significant, and no net-
work like NAAG exists to facilitate those efforts.
337 See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental
Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 (2014).
338 Kriger Interview, supra note 38.  Since the 1980s, the FTC has explicitly focused on
national trade practices. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 2.
339 Start with Security: A Guide for Business, FTC (June 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/start-security-guide-business (discussing “10 practical les-
sons businesses can learn from the FTC’s 50+ data security settlements”).
340 Id. at 2256.  In 1969, an ABA commission urged the FTC to coordinate with local
enforcement agencies to have them handle local consumer abuses. REPORT OF THE ABA
COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N (1969), reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. 883, 948 (1969) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ABA COMM’N].
341 Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at 600.
342 Id. at 625.
343 Id. at 619.
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coming years is unclear.344  President-elect Donald Trump has two commis-
sioner seats to fill and will appoint a new chairperson to lead the agency.345
Career staff’s consumer privacy and data security efforts may be stymied by
politics.346
Added to that concern are federal lawmakers’ efforts to slash the FTC’s
budget.347  Attorneys general would serve as a crucial fail-safe in the event
that the FTC was forced to slow down its privacy and security work.  Chris
Hoofnagle has written about the role that state attorneys general played after
an angry Congress shut down the FTC not once but twice in the 1980s after
the agency crusaded too vigorously against used car salesmen, the funeral
industry, and children’s advertising.348  Reagan-era leadership brought the
FTC nearly to a halt, and during this time, class action lawyers and state attor-
neys general took up the slack.349  More recently, state attorneys general
stepped in to address predatory lending, discriminatory lending, and foreclo-
sure abuse when federal enforcers failed to address fraudulent practices
related to the mortgage crisis of the late 2000s.350  This possibility cautions
against efforts to preempt the privacy enforcement power of state attorneys
general.
Given the important role that attorneys general have played in address-
ing privacy and data security issues, their enforcement power should not be
curtailed or eliminated without careful consideration.  Attorneys general
have pioneered, shaped, and stabilized privacy norms while ensuring that
344 The FTC is led by five commissioners appointed by the president and confirmed by
the Senate for seven-year terms. Id. at 608.  “No more than three commissioners can be
members of the same political party.” Id.  The president chooses one commissioner to act
as chairperson. Id. There are currently two empty FTC commissioner seats; President-
elect Donald Trump can appoint members of the Republican Party to fill those seats.
345 Current FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez’s seven-year term ends in 2017.  Ramirez
began her service on the Commission in 2010.  She was selected by President Obama to
replace Jon Leibowitz as FTC Chairperson when Leibowitz stepped down in 2013. See
Edward Wyatt, White House Elevates a Commissioner to Chairwoman of the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/business/obama-set-to-appoint-
edith-ramirez-to-fill-top-ftc-post.html.
346 See Michael Kan, Worries and Uncertainty Cloud Outlook for Digital Privacy Under Presi-
dent Trump, CIO (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.cio.com/article/3140182/security/worries-
and-uncertainty-cloud-outlook-for-digital-privacy-under-president-trump.html (discussing
concerns that Donald Trump’s pro-business positions will strip away data security and data
privacy regulations designed to protect consumers).
347 Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, Think the FTC Is the De Facto U.S. Data Protection
Authority? State AGs May Have Something to Say, PRIVACY PERSPS. (Dec. 12, 2013), https://iapp
.org/news/a/think-the-ftc-is-the-de-facto-u-s-data-protection-authority-state-ags-may/.
348 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 2, at 66.
349 Id. at 73. In the 1960s, sharp disagreement among the five commissioners rendered
its consumer protection mission ineffective. REPORT OF THE ABA COMM’N, supra note 340,
at 891.  During that period, the FTC endorsed the adoption of state UDAP laws.  That
history underscores the importance of attorneys general in the protection of consumer
privacy.
350 See Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611
(2015).
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companies internalize some of the costs of data harms that would otherwise
be borne by consumers alone.351  State enforcers have engaged in a produc-
tive dialogue with federal enforcers, resulting in more comprehensive protec-
tion for consumers.  They have been able to pursue privacy initiatives quickly
because career staff do not have to worry about whether a majority of federal
commissioners endorse their actions.  Attorneys general should remain equal
enforcement partners to federal agencies given their unique ability to lever-
age local knowledge and expertise quickly and efficiently.352
c. Preempting State Law
Should Congress adopt data protection legislation that supplants state
laws?  Whether preemptive federal laws should be adopted depends upon the
specific protections afforded consumers and the concomitant gains in effi-
ciency.353  If a federal law would offer a strong level of protection or set a
statutory floor that could be strengthened by state law, then the question is
worth serious consideration.354  Once a federal bill with a real chance of pas-
sage is proposed, its costs and benefits can be meaningfully explored.
The issue of federal preemption is often raised in the context of data-
breach notification proposals.355  The FTC has taken the position that “a
strong and consistent national requirement would simplify compliance by
businesses while ensuring that all consumers are protected.”356  The National
Conference of State Legislatures357 and forty-nine attorneys general support
federal legislative proposals that would set a floor for breach notification but
allow state lawmakers to layer on more restrictive rules.358  Along these lines,
351 See Solove & Citron, supra note 332.  If courts change their view of plaintiffs’ privacy
and data security cases or if the resources provided federal agencies become unlimited, a
reassessment of this view would be in order.
352 See 115 CONG. REC. 1539 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Nelson) (criticizing the FTC for
delaying investigations to protect industry).
353 See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 1 (providing a careful and thought-
ful approach to efforts to preempt state privacy and security legislation).
354 See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 91, at 255 (noting that in the environmental arena, fed-
eral regulatory statutes set minimum standards that permit states to enact tougher
standards).
355 See, e.g., Data, Privacy & Sec. Practice Grp., Federal Bills Pursue Comprehensive Data
Breach Notification, KING & SPALDING (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/
KSPublic/library/publication/ca101414.pdf; see also Jedidiah Bracey, Are Multiple Mobile
Privacy Guidelines Helping or Hurting the Mobile Ecosystem?, IAPP (June 27, 2013), https://
iapp.org/news/a/are-multiple-mobile-privacy-guidelines-helping-or-hurting-the-mobile-
ecosys/.
356 Data, Privacy & Sec. Practice Grp., supra note 355.
357 Id.
358 Letter from State Att’ys Gen. to Cong. Leaders (July 7, 2015), http://www.ct.gov/
ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2015/20150707_naag_data_breach_notification_letter.pdf.
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Congress adopted health privacy and financial privacy laws that set a floor for
breach notification, thus allowing states to adopt stricter requirements.359
In the absence of a preemptive federal data-breach notification law (or
other such laws), state attorneys general should work to harmonize the patch-
work of state laws, as California recently suggested.360  Idaho AG Lawrence
Wasden has urged state attorneys general to work together to identify the
“best aspects” of data-breach laws and work to amend them so “that they are
more homogenous.”361  The NAAG Privacy Working Group provides an
effective forum for organizing such activity.362  Attorneys general have pro-
posed state privacy legislation modeled after another state’s law.363  Harmo-
nization around security and privacy best practices is something career staff
and attorneys general have emphasized as a goal, and it should be.
More broadly, calls for federal preemption are animated by concerns
that AG enforcement will result in a one-way ratchet to stronger regulation.
Upward regulatory creep could serve as a barrier to entry.364  Companies like
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google have ample resources to pay for
legal compliance, but smaller companies or startups may not.  Consider a
startup mobile app developer.  As soon as the developer’s app is offered in
the iTunes store, consumers in all fifty states can download it.  Will the devel-
oper be able to shoulder the expense of compliance with the privacy and
data security rules in all of those states?  Will the cost of compliance squeeze
out upstarts like the developer?  Not always.  New businesses can outsource
compliance to lawyers who specialize in helping startups with regulatory hur-
dles.365  Alternatively, they might accept the risks associated with being
mostly compliant or ignore the rules since law enforcers tend to focus on
larger companies than smaller ones.366
Then too, it is important to recognize that the costs of stronger regula-
tion are offset by its benefits.  Improvements in data security mean less fraud
and identity theft, which would reduce the negative externalities borne by
359 Relatedly, preemption attacks on state UDAP laws have been unsuccessful.  Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not preempt them.  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v.
FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 989 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
360 See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT
2012–2015 (Feb. 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/breachreport2016.  Other attorneys general
emphatically agree with this point. See, e.g., Zoeller Interview, supra note 200.  Federal
lawmakers have tried to pass a federal data-breach notification law since 2005 but with no
success. See CITRON, supra note 170; see also Data, Privacy & Security Practice Grp., supra
note 355, at 4 n.9.  Gridlock has prevented federal legislation across the board.
361 Smoyer & Lah, supra note 256.
362 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
363 California legislation served as a model for Delaware Attorney General Matt Denn
when he drafted the recently enacted student privacy bill and a law requiring privacy poli-
cies.  Wright Interview, supra note 114.
364 Thanks to David Law for raising this concern with me.
365 Andrew Keane Woods, Silicon Valley’s Regulatory Lament, LAWFARE BLOG (June 3,
2016, 2:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/silicon-valleys-regulatory-lament.
366 Id.
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consumers, banks, payment processors, and merchants.  Stronger privacy and
data security protections would enhance consumers’ trust in companies’
products and services.367  They would emulate certain aspects of the EU’s
data protection regime, thus encouraging cross-Atlantic commerce.  Ulti-
mately, however, if state privacy regulation becomes so complex and onerous
and its costs far exceed its benefits, federal lawmakers should take seriously
the question of a preemptive national data protection regime.
d. Capture Concerns
What about the opposite concern—that state attorneys general are vul-
nerable to influence designed to discourage privacy enforcement?  Attorneys
general are increasingly subject to aggressive lobbying.368  In a prize-winning
series of articles for The New York Times, Eric Lipton exposed troubling prac-
tices by lawyers and former attorneys general, including the “use [of] cam-
paign contributions” and “personal appeals at lavish corporate-sponsored
conferences,” to push attorneys general “to drop investigations, change poli-
cies, negotiate favorable settlements or pressure federal regulators.”369
Lobbying might explain why some attorneys general tread lightly when it
comes to privacy or data security violations.370  But even if some states fall
367 For an important work on trust and privacy, see Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
368 Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneys-
general.html?_r=0.
369 Id.  Indeed, the point is particularly salient in the 2016 presidential election. See
Steve Eder & Megan Twohey, Donald Trump’s Donation Is His Latest Brush with Campaign
Fund Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/politics/
donald-trump-pam-bondi.html?_r=0.  In 2013, Florida AG Pam Bondi’s office was investi-
gating Trump University for violating the state’s UDAP law.  While the investigation was
ongoing, AG Bondi solicited Donald Trump for a campaign contribution, which his foun-
dation arranged.  After the donation was received, the Florida AG’s Office dropped its
investigation of Trump University.  The donation (and a subsequent fundraiser held by
Trump in AG Bondi’s honor) has been subject to complaints about the corrupting influ-
ence of money in politics. See Sara Gonzales, The Trump University Corruption Story Just Got
Worse for Pam Bondi (and Donald Trump), REDSTATE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.redstate
.com/saragonzales/2016/09/07/trump-university-corruption-story-just-got-worse-pam-
bondi-trump/.
370 Attorneys general have complained about the politicization of the office and the
emergence of the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) and the Republican
Attorneys General Association (RAGA). See Former Arkansas Attorney General and Former
United States Senator Mark Pryor Visits Columbia Law School, Discuss the Politicization of the Office
of State Attorney General, COLUM. L. SCH.: NAT’L STATE ATT’YS GEN. PROGRAM (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/attorneys-general/mark_pry
or_-april_2015.mp3.  DAGA was founded in 2002. Democratic Attorneys General Association,
BALLOTPEDIA: ENCYCLOPEDIA AM. POL., https://ballotpedia.org/Democratic_Attorneys_
General_Association (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).  RAGA was founded in 1999. See About
RAGA, RAGA, http://www.republicanags.com/about (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).  Despite
such politicization, attorneys general and staff have repeatedly emphasized that politics has
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prey to influence peddling, other states will not.  As Mark Totten has
insightfully argued, while no individual state attorney general is resistant to
capture, it is unlikely that all fifty attorneys general will succumb to the
demands of lobbyists.371
Further militating against interest group capture is politics.372  State
attorneys general are an ambitious lot; many go on to higher office.373  Many
of the privacy leaders of the 1990s are now U.S. senators and governors.374
Elected attorneys general further their careers with high-visibility investiga-
tions.375  They win favor with constituents by pursuing consumer protection
matters.376
As this study shows, influence peddling has not eliminated AG interest in
privacy and data security issues.  Attorneys general have investigated privacy
violations of industry players from all sectors of the economy, including
major credit-reporting agencies, retailers, technology companies, banks, hos-
pitals, and insurance companies.  When attorneys general have intervened,
their enforcement activity has had important spillover effects.
The increasing level of lobbying of attorneys general is troubling, to be
sure.  It does “create[ ], at the minimum, the appearance of undue influ-
ence.”377  The problem could be partially addressed with more robust disclo-
sure laws.  But concerns about capture do not justify the removal of state
attorneys general from the privacy enforcement calculus.
e. Dormant Commerce Clause
What about federalism concerns implicated by the dormant Commerce
Clause?  Does the array of state privacy and data security laws interfere with
the integration of the nation into a single market and national polity?  The
dormant Commerce Clause is an implied restraint on state activity stemming
from the Supreme Court’s construction of the Commerce Clause.378  Under
the Court’s jurisprudence, states may regulate interstate commerce unless a
played little role in the enforcement of data privacy and security matters. See Christopher
R. Nolen, State Attorneys General Offer Perspectives on Data Breaches, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54a5a467-747b-4d85-ad1d-3fafade085b7
(stating that privacy and data security are on the agenda “whether it is the Republican
Attorneys General Association, the Democratic Attorneys General Association or the
National Attorneys General Association”).
371 Totten, supra note 350, at 1658.
372 Lemos, supra note 94, at 721–22.
373 Provost, supra note 56, at 37.
374 Former New York AG Eliot Spitzer (1999–2007) went on to become governor in
2007; Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal (1991–2011) was elected to the U.S. Senate in
2011; Michigan AG Jennifer Granholm (1999–2003) was elected to the U.S. Senate in
2003.
375 Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 2143, 2145.
376 Id. at 2145; see also Clayton, supra note 19; Provost, supra note 328, at 612.
377 Lipton, supra note 368.
378 Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys Gen-
eral in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2023 (2001).
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state regulation “clearly discriminate[s] against interstate commerce” and is
not “demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protec-
tionism”379 or “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”380
Do state laws invoked by attorneys general in multistate and individual
enforcement actions, notably state data-breach notification laws, violate those
principles?  To date, no court has struck down a state data-breach notifica-
tion law on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.381
As a start, breach notification laws would not violate the anti-discrimina-
tion principle.382  The burden imposed on interstate commerce by data-
breach notification laws arguably is not “clearly excessive” in relation to the
benefits of those laws.  Companies can readily identify the state citizens cov-
ered by the statutes and thus can provide notice according to each state’s
law.383  The cost of compliance is not excessive in light of the benefits to
consumers.  The state interest in ensuring notification of data breaches is
strong.  Without notice, consumers would not know to monitor their credit
for fraud; companies might be inclined to skimp on data security since
breaches would cost them nothing if hidden from the public and regula-
tors.384  State data-breach notification laws fill an important gap.  Federal
379 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
380 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
381 See Anthony Glosson, California Lawmakers vs. the Dormant Commerce Clause, ANTHONY
GLOSSON BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:46 AM), http://anthonyglosson.com/california-lawmak
ers-vs-the-dormant-commerce-clause/.
382 Bilyana Petkova, who has written insightfully about privacy federalism, writes that
the anti-discrimination approach is wise given that “[t]here is no way of knowing whether a
state experiment is going to be successful without giving it time to unfold.”  Bilyana
Petkova, The Long-Term Promise of Privacy Federalism, Part I, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 1,
2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/09/the-long-term-promise-of-privacy-
federalism-part-1-guest-blog-post.htm.
383 The recently amended California data-breach notification law requires companies
to disclose breaches involving login information.  Anthony Glosson argues that “[b]ecause
log-in information, by itself, provides no indication of a user’s state of residence, the law
forces websites either to post embarrassing breach notifications prominently to their own
pages, or to collect more information in order to distinguish between California or non-
California users.”  Glosson, supra note 381.  That dormant Commerce Clause argument is
worth close study given the potential burdens on companies and the possibility that con-
sumers may be worse off if companies have to engage in re-identification to accomplish the
statute’s goals.  Such study must acknowledge the important reason behind the amend-
ment.  Because consumers often use the same login information for different accounts,
notice of a breach would nudge consumers to change their login information across the
board, preventing fraud at other sites.
384 Donald G. Gifford presents a thoughtful separation of powers argument about mul-
tistate tobacco litigation in his book, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010).  As Gifford explains, the
separation of powers inquiry does not apply to the state in its relationship with Congress.
See id.  Gifford argues that attorneys general become legislators when they invoke ill-
defined common law doctrines to create a national regulatory regime in multistate settle-
ments. See id.  By contrast, in multistate privacy and security cases, attorneys general are
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health and financial privacy laws require notice of breaches, but they only
apply to certain data holders and certain types of health and financial data.
2. Tactics and Strategies
Attorneys general have successfully employed various tactics, including
legislative efforts and persuasion campaigns.  Other tactics, however, are
worth close inspection.
a. Reimagining Informal Agreements
The norm-shaping efforts of attorneys general may not be as effective as
they could be due to their overreliance on informal agreements known as
AVCs.  Under the typical AVC, violations amount to prima facie evidence of
lawbreaking.385  Violators incur no obligations, fines, or penalties unless the
attorney general files a lawsuit on the substantive violation and wins.  In other
words, noncompliance can only be punished if offices file a formal
complaint.
Companies favor AVCs with such terms because violations do not result
in automatic penalties.386  Many companies that agree to change their prac-
tices will do so, but some may not.  AVCs drafted in this way will fail to gener-
ate the same fear and interest sparked by lawsuits and consent decrees
because companies risk little when they ignore them.  That violators have
little to worry about if they break their promises undermines the privacy-
norm entrepreneurship of attorneys general.  Informal agreements can influ-
ence privacy and data security practices if they are taken seriously.  If, how-
ever, AVCs are viewed as paper tigers, then they are virtually worthless.  AVCs
would be more influential if attorneys general brought suit in the wake of a
violation.
All AVCs should employ strong terms.  Attorneys general should insist
that violations of agreements amount to lawbreaking.  In Maryland and Iowa,
violations of informal agreements warrant immediate penalty.387  Multistate
AVCs similarly provide that states have automatic authority to enforce or seek
sanctions for violations of their terms.388  That should be true of all AVCs.  As
Iowa Assistant Attorney General Nathan Blake explains, when informal agree-
ments make clear that violations put the party into contempt and those
agreements are widely available to the public, they can be as influential as
consent decrees.389
applying state UDAP laws, other state statutes, or federal sectoral laws.  There is no legisla-
tive usurpation where attorneys general are enforcing state and sometimes federal laws.
385 See, e.g., Affinity Health Plan AVC, supra note 138 (stating that evidence of violation
amounts to “prima facie proof of a violation of the applicable statutes”).
386 Telephone Interview with Divonne Smoyer, Partner, Reed & Smith (July 6, 2015).
387 See Telephone Interview with Nathan Blake, Iowa Assistant Attorney Gen. (June 21,
2016) [hereinafter Blake Interview]; see also Ask.fm Settlement, supra note 88.
388 See, e.g., PointRoll AVC, supra note 154.
389 Blake Interview, supra note 387.
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Stronger terms should be coupled with careful compliance checks.
Those checks should involve independent audits by third parties that report
results directly to states.390  States should impose strong sanctions if audits
reveal non-compliance.391  Stronger terms coupled with aggressive compli-
ance would enhance the norm-setting potential of AVCs.392
Another aspect of informal agreements should be assessed: their trans-
parency.  AVCs can change practices and policy only if the public finds out
about them.  If AVCs are covered by non-disclosure agreements, they cannot
educate the public.  To be sure, there may be costs to proceeding publicly:
trust between regulators and entities could be lost.393  Career staff explained
that some non-disclosure agreements engendered proactive compliance.394
Concerns about trust should be considered, but with a thumb on the scale in
favor of transparency.
Attorneys general should follow the lead of the FTC in not only publiciz-
ing agreements, but also frequently weaving them together to show the les-
sons of those agreements.  After a number of consent decrees, the FTC often
circles back in blog posts to discuss the significance of recent cases.395  This
can help educate the public, established businesses, and startup companies
alike.  This approach would reinforce the norm-setting work of state attor-
neys general.
b. Formal Adjudication
A broader critique relates to state enforcers’ preference for informal
agreements over formal adjudication.  To be sure, there are states with active
390 Informal agreements sometimes secure opportunities for state oversight.  Multistate
AVCs often require that states be allowed to inspect privacy programs. See, e.g., PointRoll
AVC, supra note 154; see also In re Maloney Props., Inc., Civ. No. 12-112 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Mar.
21, 2012) (order granting assurance of discontinuance/assurance of voluntary compli-
ance).  Others require third-party audits but say nothing about reporting them to states.
See, e.g., Health Net AVC, supra note 226 (requiring a third-party audit by security profes-
sionals after the loss an of unencrypted hard drive with consumer data).
391 In the 1960s, the FTC was strongly criticized for its overreliance on informal agree-
ments that had little bite and no oversight. REPORT OF THE ABA COMM’N, supra note 340.
An ABA commission made recommendations along the lines I suggested above, and the
FTC’s current approach focuses on seeking cease and desist orders and filing formal
actions. See Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2.
392 State attorneys general should press for stronger civil penalties to make deterrence
meaningful.  In a case against a notorious spammer filed by the New York Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office, the Office eventually settled for only $50,000 after promising to seek damages
of over $20 million.  The defendant laughingly admitted that the modest settlement
wouldn’t “change his business practices at all.”  Stacy Cowley, N.Y. AG Settles with Self-
Described ‘Spam King’, COMPUTERWORLD (July 23, 2004), http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2566184/technology-law-regulation/n-y—ag-settles-with-self-described—spam-king-
.html.
393 See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 367.
394 Ruckman Interview, supra note 41.
395 Lesley Fair, Speaking of Spokeo: Part 3, FTC BUS. BLOG (June 15, 2012, 11:02 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2012/06/speaking-spokeo-part-3.
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privacy litigation dockets.396  Some states display a preference for litigation
over informal agreements.397  But, as responses to FOIA requests show, the
better part of state investigations end in informal agreements.
The preference for informal agreements has everything to do with the
fact that states have limited resources.  Within those constraints, state enforc-
ers should consider the important role that formal adjudication plays.  Plead-
ings and other litigation documents educate the public.398  Complaints
articulate a state’s theory of why an entity’s actions constitute an unfair or
deceptive act or practice.
To the extent that states have resources, they ought to think about the
expressive and coercive advantages of formal proceedings.  The FTC’s pri-
mary tool of enforcement is litigation, which usually ends in consent decrees.
As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have shown, those consent decrees
are greeted with public fanfare and close inspection by regulated entities.399
To be sure, the FTC has been subject to criticism for its reliance on
consent decrees.  Critics have attacked the substance of those agreements,
contending that they pay insufficient attention to cost-benefit analysis.400
During his tenure, FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright argued that the agency
needed to engage in more rigorous economic analysis in its section 5
cases.401  In co-authored scholarship, then-Professor Wright argued that
adjudications of private claims under state UDAP laws showed that those acts
were not truly “Little-FTC Acts” because they failed to engage in rigorous
cost-benefit analysis.402
396 Texas is the most actively engaged in individual enforcement activities.  The FOIA
response from the Texas Attorney General’s Office produced eleven AVCs, seven settle-
ment agreements, three judgments, and one ongoing case over the past five years.  Two of
the Office’s cases proceeded through the stages of litigation.  Texas has taken the lead in
several multistate actions.
397 Some states eschew informal agreements (or AVCs) in favor of litigation.  This is
true of California’s privacy cases.  Based on the response to a FOIA request, in the past five
years, the Attorney General’s Office filed five lawsuits, all ending in settlement agreements;
no AVCs were filed.  Similarly, the FOIA response from Massachusetts indicated that the
Attorney General’s Office entered into two AVCs and seven consent judgments in the past
five years.  California and Massachusetts are actively involved in multistate investigations.
398 See CITRON, supra note 170 (exploring the powerful expressive role of law).
399 See Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 2, at 607.
400 Berin Szoka, Josh Wright’s Unfinished Legacy: Reforming FTC Consumer Protection Enforce-
ment, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://truthonthemarket.com/2015/08/26/
josh-wrights-unfinished-legacy/.
401 Id.  Commissioner Wright dissented from the agency’s policy reports on Data Bro-
kers and the Internet of Things on the grounds that they lacked economic analysis of the
privacy issues. Id.
402 Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-
FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011) (finding that successful private suits under state
UDAP laws would not have been successful under section 5, which does not allow private
rights of action).  Private claims assessed by Butler and Wright did not focus on privacy or
data security issues.  If they had, courts would have likely dismissed them on the grounds
that plaintiffs failed to show cognizable harm. See Solove & Citron, supra note 332.
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Yet, as Ryan Calo thoughtfully shows, privacy protections embedded in
the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence support market mechanisms.403  The FTC’s
section 5 cases addressing inadequate data security and privacy violations
stem from its attention to the market benefits of privacy and its engagement
in cost-benefit analysis.404  This accords with interviews with career staff and
state attorneys general: cost-benefit analysis is crucial to state enforcers when
considering whether to begin an investigation.405  Both the market benefits
of innovation and privacy should be considered, as it seems they are for fed-
eral and state enforcers.
c. Closing Letters
The FTC has issued closing letters, which explain why it has dropped an
investigation.  Closing letters explain why the agency thought a company’s
practices met the law’s requirements.  Attorneys general do not issue closing
letters or advisory opinions on privacy and data security issues, but should
they?  Might a closing letter or advisory opinion signal and solidify norms by
identifying activity that falls within the bounds of the law?
Career staff have expressed skepticism about the idea.  Of advisory opin-
ions, Massachusetts Assistant AG Sara Cable remarked:
It could put the AG in a tight spot if [it] put out an advisory opinion and it
goes stale.  The office could put out an opinion and then come to realize it
did not have a full grasp on things.  The landscape shifts so quickly.  Also,
there may be a disincentive to do an advisory opinion because it could
weaken the office’s enforcement posture.406
State attorneys general and career staff might understand their legisla-
tive advocacy as akin to closing letters or rulemakings.  Recent legislation,
from bans on employer access to employees’ social media to limits on the use
of student data for marketing, addresses practices that are unfair and decep-
tive.  Typically, violations of those laws constitute per se violations of UDAP
laws.  If understood in that light, state attorneys general might reconsider the
usefulness of closing letters or advisory opinions.
d. Thicker Norms and Blind Spots
State attorneys general should continue to press for thicker privacy
norms to address emerging challenges.  As pressures mount to ensure that
U.S. data practices are adequate in the eyes of European authorities, state
403 See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2015).
404 See id.
405 See, e.g., Cable Interview, supra note 59; Fitzsimmons Interview, supra note 5; Kriger
Interview, supra note 38.  To be sure, when UDAP laws do not have an explicit harm
requirement, offices have more flexibility to think about cases where the privacy harm is
more intangible but no less real.  Cable Interview, supra note 59; Kriger Interview, supra
note 38.
406 Cable Interview, supra note 59.
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enforcers should continue to work on areas of convergence to enhance trust
and facilitate trade.
State enforcers should continue to address new frontiers for privacy pro-
tection.  There are shadowy data practices in need of oversight.  Certain uses
of Big Data should be on the agendas of state attorneys general.  For
instance, behavioral-scoring algorithms rate consumers’ likelihood to engage
in risk-taking activities, to underperform on the job, or to develop mental
illnesses.407  Some of those uses of Big Data may fall outside the domain of
FCRA or anti-discrimination laws.408  Attorneys general should investigate
unfair and deceptive uses of scoring algorithms given their potential to fur-
ther marginalize vulnerable populations.  Because use restrictions are hotly
contested, the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence has not addressed them.  Attor-
neys general should continue their role as pioneers to curtail certain uses of
scoring products.409
The data brokerage industry similarly deserves the scrutiny of state
enforcers.  Data brokers “amass digital dossiers on individuals that include
incomplete and misleading data, selling them to potential employers,” insur-
ers, and landlords.410  In most instances, consumers have no idea that such
dossiers have cost them crucial opportunities.  Individuals have no leverage
to force data brokers to disclose or correct those dossiers.  Former FTC Com-
missioner Julie Brill pressed attorneys general to investigate data brokers
under FCRA and state UDAP laws.411  Attorneys general can go further than
the procedural protections of FCRA.  Relying on state UDAP laws, state attor-
neys general should seek stronger restrictions on the data brokerage
industry.
Last, there are stalking cellphone apps whose entire enterprise is argua-
bly illegal.412  Once installed on someone’s phone, stalking apps secretly
track everything someone does with a cellphone and upload the activity to a
407 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 159, at 2–6; see Sam Pfeifle, How Big Data Discrimi-
nates, IAPP (June 24, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-big-data-discriminates/ (dis-
cussing concerns created by systems using data and algorithms to include and exclude
people from opportunities, and discussing Citron and Pasquale’s The Scored Society, supra
note 159).  For troubling uses of scoring products in the criminal justice system, see Julia
Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals.
And It’s Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
408 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV.
671 (2016).
409 There are offices interested in investigating such practices though their work has yet
to be publicly revealed.
410 Citron, Mainstreaming, supra note 333, at 1816; see Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of
Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 240, 266 n.131 (2007).
411 Paul Bond & Christine Nielsen Czuprynski, Commissioner Brill to States: Data Brokers
Aren’t Going to Regulate Themselves, REEDSMITH: TECH. L. DISPATCH (Apr. 18, 2013), http://
www.technologylawdispatch.com/2013/04/privacy-data-protection/commissioner-brill-to-
states-data-brokers-arent-going-to-regulate-themselves/.
412 Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1246–48 (2015).
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site that stalkers can watch in real time.413  In previous work, I have called
upon state attorneys general to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief
against spyware and stalking app providers under state UDAP and wiretap
laws.414  Attorneys general should devote efforts to updating state wiretap
laws to ensure the illegality of the sale of apps designed to secretly intercept
communications.415
These are but a few examples of blind spots: privacy-invasive practices
that have largely been ignored by enforcers.  As this study shows, state attor-
neys general have been pioneers.  They have a variety of tools to forge thicker
privacy norms and to address blind spots.  As a group, they have more
resources than federal agencies.416  They should harness their collective
power to tackle these problems and to press for thicker protections.
CONCLUSION
State attorneys general have played a critical role in U.S. privacy law,
which until now has received scant appreciation and study.  Much as Justice
Louis Brandeis imagined states as laboratories of the law, offices of state
attorneys general have been laboratories of privacy enforcement.  Attorneys
general have used their broad legal authority and unique local knowledge to
address gaps in the law.  They have established baseline privacy protections
and paved new frontiers for privacy practices.  In areas where federal agen-
cies have valuable technical and policy expertise but less manpower, AG
offices have been crucial enforcement partners, harmonizing federal norms.
AG privacy policymaking will be even more important if federal agencies slow
down consumer privacy and data security efforts.
Looking forward, state attorneys general should harness their collective
power to press for thicker data protections.  They should act more boldly in
the face of uses of Big Data and scoring algorithms that disadvantage the
vulnerable.  This Article hopefully marks the beginning of a more sustained
conversation about the privacy policymaking of state attorneys general and
the future directions that it can take.
413 Id.
414 See id.
415 Id. at 1274–77 (arguing that state wiretapping laws should be updated to cover the
sale and manufacturer of stalking apps and suggesting legislative language to update the
law).
416 Indeed, the entire budget of the FTC is less than the California AG’s Office.  For
instance, in 2015, the FTC requested $293 million for its entire budget. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 35 (2014), https://www
.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2015-congressional-budget-justification/2015-
cbj.pdf.  The budget for the California Department of Justice, led by AG Harris, was more
than $741 million in 2012. Attorney General of California, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia
.org/Attorney_General_of_California (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 66 19-JAN-17 13:20
812 notre dame law review [vol. 92:2
APPENDIX I: SAMPLE FOIA REQUEST LETTER
Dear FOIA Coordinator:
Under [specific state open records law], I am requesting an opportunity
to inspect or obtain information regarding the Attorney General’s efforts
related to the collection, use, storage, and/or disclosure of consumers’ per-
sonal data.
For the purpose of this request, the phrase “collection, use, storage,
and/or disclosure of consumers’ personal data” encompasses various issues,
including but not limited to data breaches; data security; data-breach notifi-
cation; spyware; spam; robocalls or unwanted telephone calls; facial recogni-
tion software; privacy policies; sale of consumer data; collection or use of
consumers’ personal data without notice and/or consent; and the like.
(1) Please provide copies of all pre-investigatory letters your office sent
to an entity or person regarding the collection, use, storage, and/or disclo-
sure of consumers’ personal data covering the period of 2010 to the present.
(2) Please provide copies of all assurances of voluntary compliance (or
assurances of voluntary discontinuance) your office entered into with an
entity or person regarding the collection, use, storage, and/or disclosure of
consumers’ personal data covering the period of 2010 to the present.
(3) Please provide copies of all litigation-related documents (including
but not limited to pleadings and settlements) your office filed or entered into
with an entity or person regarding the collection, use, storage, and/or disclo-
sure of consumers’ personal data covering the period of 2010 to the present.
(4) Please provide copies of all assurances of voluntary compliance (or
assurances of voluntary discontinuance) or consent decrees/settlements
related to multistate investigations regarding the collection, use, storage,
and/or disclosure of consumers’ personal data covering the period of 2010
to the present.
(5) Please provide copies of all documents, including best practice
guides, issued by your office in which the office gives advice to companies or
consumers regarding the collection, use, storage, and/or disclosure of con-
sumers’ personal data covering the period of 2010 to the present.
(6) Please provide copies of all documents related to your office’s
efforts to propose, lobby for, or support state or federal legislation related to
the collection, use, storage, and/or disclosure of consumers’ personal data
covering the period of 2010 to the present.
If there are any fees for searching or compiling this information, please
inform me in advance.  However, I would like to request a waiver of all fees
because the disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest,
is made in connection with a scholarly project, and will contribute signifi-
cantly to the public’s understanding of your state’s interest in consumer pro-
tection.  My scholarship focuses on information privacy law.  This request is
made in connection with research focusing on the privacy policymaking of
state attorneys general.  This information is not being sought for commercial
purposes.
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Thank you for considering and responding to this request.  I look for-
ward to hearing from you.  Your open records law requires a response within
[ ] business days.  If my request will take longer, please contact me with infor-
mation about when I might expect copies or the ability to inspect the
records.
If you deny any or all of these records, please cite each specific exemp-
tion you feel justifies the refusal to release the information requested and
notify me of your appeal procedures under the law.  I can be reached at [e-
mail address] or [cell phone number].
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APPENDIX II: FOIA REQUEST AND INTERVIEW DATA
State FOIA Request Interview
AL Denied (Noncitizen)
AK Yes
AZ Yes Yes (Staff)
AR Denied (Noncitizen)
CA Yes Yes (AG/Staff)
COL Yes
CT Yes Yes (AG/Staff)
DE Yes Yes (Staff)
FL Yes
GA Yes
GU Yes
HI Yes
ID Yes
IL Yes Yes (Staff)
IN Yes Yes (AG)
IA Yes Yes (Staff)
KS Yes
KY Yes
LA Yes
MA Yes Yes (Staff)
ME Yes Yes (Staff)
MD Yes Yes (AG/Staff)
MI Yes
MN Yes
MS Yes
MO Yes
MT $263.79 fee
NE $4255.76 fee
NV Yes
NH Yes
NJ No
NM Yes
NY Yes Yes (Staff)
NC Yes
ND Yes
MP No
OH Yes Yes (Staff)
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APPENDIX II (CONT’D)
OK Yes
OR Yes
PA Yes
PR No
RI Yes
SC Yes
SD No
TN Denied (Noncitizen)
TX Yes
UT Yes
VT Yes Yes (Staff)
VI No
VA Denied (Noncitizen)
WA Yes Yes (Staff)
WV Yes
WI Yes
WY Yes
DC Yes
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